SULLIVAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which COX, C.J., and CRAWFORD, GIERKE, and EFFRON, JJ., joined.

For Appellant: Captain Donald P. Chisholm (argued); Colonel John T. Phelps, II, Lieutenant Colonel Adele H. Odegard, and Major Holly S. G. Coffey (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Walters and Captain T. Michael Guiffre.

For Appellee: Captain Mary E. Braisted (argued); Colonel Russell S. Estey (on brief); Colonel Joseph E. Ross, Lieutenant Colonel Frederic L. Borch, III, Lieutenant Colonel Eugene R. Milhizer, and Major Randy V. Cargill.

Military Judge: Larry R. Dean
 

During August and September of 1996, appellant was tried by a general court-martial consisting of officer members at Fort Benning, Georgia. Pursuant to his pleas, he was found guilty of absence without leave and disobeying a noncommissioned officer, in violation of Articles 86 and 91, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 886 and 891, respectively. Contrary to his pleas, he was found guilty of aggravated assault by intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm, in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, 10 USC § 928. He was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and confinement for 3 years.

On December 31, 1996, the convening authority approved the adjudged sentence. On March 5, 1998, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings of guilty, but as to the aggravated assault affirmed only the lesser-included offense of assault with a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm. The court then reassessed the sentence and affirmed a bad-conduct discharge and 2 years’ confinement.

This Court granted review on July 27, 1998, on the following issue assigned by appellant:

The Court of Criminal Appeals found the following facts concerning the granted issue:

PFC Guinard was the principal government witness in this case, and he testified to the facts surrounding his assault and the theft of his car. The Government’s last witness on the merits was Mr. McGunagle, a former military law enforcement agent. He was called to testify to appellant’s post-invocation question concerning his probable jail time for auto theft. He testified as follows:

A hearing on this matter then ensued outside the presence of the members. There it was said:

Appellate defense counsel asks this Court to set aside all the findings of guilty in this case on the basis of a single comment made by a prosecution witness that appellant invoked his rights after he surrendered himself to the military authorities. He contends that trial counsel erroneously adduced this testimony in violation of the Constitution and that the Government was required to show such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. He finally concludes that the curative instruction cited by the Government was not sufficient to prevent prejudice in appellant’s case because "the ends of justice required the military judge to grant a mistrial." Final Brief at 5.

We recently entertained a similar question in United States v. Riley, supra, concerning impermissible comments on an accused’s exercise of his rights under Article 31, UCMJ, 10 USC n § 831. There, Judge Effron, writing for this Court, conducted a prejudice analysis based, in part, upon the effect of the error on the other prosecution and defense evidence presented in the case. 47 MJ 279-80; see generally United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1549 (11^th Cir. 1991). In an earlier case, involving improper reference to an accused’s invocation of his constitutional rights to silence and counsel, this Court focused primarily on the nature of the comment and the curative instruction given to the members in determining whether such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Garrett, 24 MJ at 418.

Here, the military judge found, and the parties to this appeal agree, that constitutional error occurred. We accept this conclusion. We must now determine what prejudice, if any, resulted from this error. In light of our case law, we conclude that all of the circumstances noted above should be considered in determining whether such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see also United States v. Mobley, 34 MJ 527, 531 (AFCMR 1991).

Turning first to the improper rights-invocation evidence, we conclude that, viewed in its entirety, it did not have great potential to prejudice appellant. It was an isolated reference to a singular invocation of rights by appellant. See Garrett, supra at 416-17 (one reference to a single invocation); cf. Riley, supra at 278 (reference to three invocations of rights by accused). It was extremely brief, providing no details as to the rights invoked or the offense or offenses for which these rights were invoked. Id. In addition, the trial judge immediately called an Article 39(a) session to consider its admissibility, and when court reconvened the next day, he promptly instructed the members to disregard it. Finally, this evidence was not affirmatively exploited by trial counsel to buttress his case against appellant on any of the charged offenses. See generally Hill v. Turpin, 135 F.3d 1411, 1417-18 (11^th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases considering the effect of prosecutor’s failure to exploit the rights-invocation evidence in a harmless error analysis).

Turning next to the curative instruction given by the judge, it is similar to the one approved in Garrett, supra at 417. He unequivocally instructed the members to disregard this witness’ testimony on this matter for all purposes. Moreover, he voir dired the members on their understanding of his instruction and gave a more general rights-invocation instruction at the close of this case. Id. at 418. In these circumstances, we can safely presume that the members did what the military judge told them to do.

We also must consider the probable impact of this inadmissible evidence on the members’ deliberations. See United States v. Riley, supra. Although circumstantial in nature, the Government’s case was overwhelming and rested largely on the uncontradicted testimony of appellant’s guard, PFC Guinard. Appellant’s sole defense was an attack on the motives and military character of Guinard and the physical improbability of his version of the events. The inadmissible invocation testimony had no direct bearing on these questions concerning Guinard’s truth-telling. Moreover, appellant did not testify, and therefore, he could not be impeached on this basis. In our view, the impact of the evidence in this case, even if considered by the members, would have been marginal. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 1550 (error harmless where evidence showing guilt is otherwise strong); cf. United States v. Riley, supra; Turpin, 135 F.3d at 1418 (error not harmless where rights invocation evidence used to impeach plausible story offered by defendant).

Finally, the military judge accepted defense counsel’s reluctant proposal (only if mistrial not declared) to continue this trial under certain conditions. As an alternative to mistrial, counsel proposed that the offending testimony be struck, curative instructions be given, and that the government agent not be allowed to testify. This last condition, opposed by the Government, prevented Agent McGunagle from testifying to appellant's subsequent spontaneous statement asking "how much time should I expect to get for a stolen car." This testimony would not only have been admissible (Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 63 F.3d 892, 893 (9^th Cir. 1995)) but it would have constituted an implied admission by appellant to the charged offenses of larceny and robbery of his guard’s automobile. In view of his subsequent acquittal of these offenses, any prejudice in this case is illusory. See United States v. Raya, 45 MJ 251, 254 (1996).

The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

FOOTNOTE:

* Art. 39(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 839(a).