2021(October Term)
United States v. Anderson, 82 M.J. 82 (appellate courts can take judicial notice of law and fact just as a military judge can under MRE 201(b))
(in this case, where the government asked an appellate court to take judicial notice of the operational tempo of appellant’s command to justify the military judge’s post-trial delay in authenticating the record of trial, the court declined to do so where the government provided no information that made indisputable the operational tempo of the command).
2019 (October Term)
United States v. Wall, 79 M.J. 456 (ripeness is the state of a dispute that has reached, but has not passed, the point when the facts have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made; the doctrine’s basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties; the problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring a court to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration).
(the ripeness doctrine originates in the Constitution’s Article III case or controversy language; nevertheless, Article I courts, such as the CAAF, generally adhere to this doctrine and ordinarily decline to consider an issue that is premature; if the appeal is not ripe, it deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction and must be dismissed).
(a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all).
2017 (October Term)
United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220 (it is a long-established principle that federal courts will avoid a constitutional question if the issue presented in a case may be adjudicated on a nonconstitutional ground; this is true even where the nonconstitutional ground, although raised at trial, is not raised by the parties on appeal).
(criminal statutes of limitations are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose).
2016 (October Term)
United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242 (federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them).2011 (September Term)
United States v. Easton, 71 M.J. 168 (judicial deference is at its apogee when the authority of Congress to govern the land and naval forces is challenged; this principle applies even when the constitutional rights of a servicemember are implicated by a statute enacted by Congress).
2008 (Transition)
Denedo
v. United States, 66 M.J. 114 (the results of
courts-martial are subject to
collateral review by courts outside the military justice system;
courts-martial
also are subject to collateral review within the military justice
system).
(when a petitioner seeks
collateral relief to
modify an action that was taken within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the
military justice system, such as the findings or sentence of a
court-martial, a
writ that is necessary or appropriate may be issued under the All Writs
Act in
aid of the court’s existing jurisdiction).
(Article 76, UCMJ, addressing
the finality of
a court-martial conviction after completion of direct review, provides
a
prudential constraint on collateral review, not a jurisdictional
limitation;
Article 76 does not expressly effect any change in the subject-matter
jurisdiction of Article
(in terms of timing, Article
76, UCMJ,
addressing the finality of a court-martial conviction after completion
of
direct review, serves as a prudential restraint on collateral review of
courts-martial pending completion of direct review; when a coram nobis
petition
is considered after completion of direct review, finality of direct
review
enhances rather than diminishes consideration of a request for
collateral
relief).
(in terms of the scope of
collateral review,
the res judicata effect of Article 76, UCMJ, addressing the finality of
a
court-martial conviction after completion of direct review, means that
the
decision on direct review will stand as final unless it fails to pass
muster
under the highly constrained standards applicable to review of final
judgments).
(under the exhaustion of
remedies doctrine,
courts outside the military justice system normally refrain from
collateral
review of courts-martial until all available military remedies are
exhausted).
(as a general matter, courts
outside the
military justice system will not entertain habeas petitions by military
prisoners until all available military remedies have been exhausted;
however, the
exhaustion requirement is prudential rather than jurisdictional; the
circumstances of a particular case might warrant consideration of a
habeas
petition by an Article
(even when remedies have been
exhausted, the
scope of collateral review outside the military justice system is
constrained
by the requirement to consider whether the military justice system has
given
full and fair consideration to the claims at issue; de novo review is
appropriate only if the military justice system manifestly refused to
consider
those claims).
(a writ of error coram nobis should be brought
before the court that rendered the judgment).
(in the military justice
system, the trial
court - the court-martial - does not have independent jurisdiction over
a case
after the military judge authenticates the record and the convening
authority
forwards the record after taking action; because the trial court is not
available for collateral review under the UCMJ or the MCM, collateral
review
within the military justice system does not occur at the trial court
level).
(the courts of criminal
appeals, the
first-level standing courts in the military justice system, provide an
appropriate forum for consideration of coram nobis petitions regarding
courts-martial; during the initial consideration of a case, they engage
in de
novo consideration of the record and expressly act on the findings and
sentence; with respect to collateral review of the present case, they
are
well-positioned to determine whether corrective action on the findings
and
sentence is warranted, including ordering any factfinding proceedings
that may
be necessary).
(when court-martial
jurisdiction has been
invoked properly at the time of trial, the jurisdiction of the court of
criminal appeals to review the case does not depend on whether a person
remains
in the armed forces at the time of such review).
(the court of criminal appeals
is an
appropriate forum to receive and consider a writ of coram nobis that
involves a
collateral challenge to that court’s approval of the findings and
sentence in a
court-martial, where the court-martial that convicted appellant had
jurisdiction
over both the person and the offense and the court of criminal appeals
had
jurisdiction to review and approve the findings and sentence on direct
review).
(a writ of error coram nobis
requests the
court that imposed the judgment to consider exceptional circumstances,
such as
new facts or legal developments, that may change the result).
(the decision of the court of
criminal appeals
on a writ petition is subject to appellate review).
(coram nobis
permits continuation of litigation after final judgment and exhaustion
or
waiver of any statutory right of review, but only under very limited
circumstances; although a petition may be filed at any time without
limitation,
a petitioner must meet stringent threshold requirements:
(1) the alleged error is of the most
fundamental character; (2) no remedy other than coram nobis is
available to
rectify the consequences of the error; (3) valid reasons exist for not
seeking
relief earlier; (4) the new information presented in the petition could
not
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence prior
to the
original judgment; (5) the writ does not seek to reevaluate previously
considered evidence or legal issues; and (6) the sentence has been
served, but
the consequences of the erroneous conviction persist).
United States v. Hunter, 65 M.J. 399 (ordinary rules of statutory construction apply in interpreting the RCM).