2023 (October Term)
United States v. Rocha, 84 M.J. 346 (in the MCM, the President does not have the power to create an offense under the UCMJ).
(presidentially enumerated elements in Part IV of the MCM standing alone can provide fair notice to servicemembers that certain conduct is criminal).
2021 (October Term)
United States v. Edwards, 82 M.J. 239 (ordinary rules of statutory construction apply in interpreting the Rules for Courts-Martial).
2016 (October Term)
United States v. Forrester, 76 M.J. 479 (in analyzing the provisions of the MCM, a court starts with the language of the text).
United States v. Reese, 76 M.J. 297 (an appellate court applies ordinary rules of statutory construction in interpreting the RCM).
United States v. Fetrow, 76 M.J. 181 (the rules of statutory construction, although generally applied to construe statutes, are helpful in analyzing evidentiary rules as well as other provisions of the MCM).
United States v. Wilson, 76 M.J. 4 (the President has the power to prescribe regulations for trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under the UCMJ; however, this power does not extend to Part IV of the MCM, and an appellate court is not bound by the President’s interpretation of the elements of substantive offenses; still, when the President’s narrowing construction of a statute does not contradict the express language of a statute, it is entitled to some deference, and an appellate court will not normally disturb that construction).
2015 (September Term)
United States v. Busch, 75 M.J. 87 (where there is no punishment listed for an offense in Part IV of the MCM, RCM 1003(c)(1)(B) establishes the procedures for determining the appropriate maximum sentence).
2014 (September Term)
United States v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364 (Article 36, UCMJ, which authorizes the President to prescribe pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, does not require the President to prescribe procedures for the military death penalty that are similar to those provisions in the US Attorneys’ Manual which set forth policies and procedures for federal civilian capital cases).
United States v. Murphy, 74 M.J. 302 (the MCM prescribes an increased maximum punishment for larceny of an explosive, irrespective of value).
2013 (September Term)
United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144 (where an offense is listed in Part IV of the MCM, the maximum punishment is set forth therein; for offenses not listed in Part IV, the maximum punishment depends on whether the offense is included in or closely related to a listed offense in the MCM; where the offenses at issue were neither listed in Part IV nor included in or closely related to any offense listed in the MCM, RCM 1003(c)(1)(B)(ii) provides that such an offense not listed in Part IV and not included in or closely related to any offense is punishable as authorized by the United States Code, or as authorized by the custom of service).
2010 (September Term)
United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (although Congress delegated to the President certain rulemaking authority under Article 36, UCMJ, not everything in the MCM represents an exercise of that authority, and the President does not have the authority to decide questions of substantive criminal law).
(some of the MCM is merely explanatory or hortatory; the sample specifications and drafters’ analysis are included among these categories and do not purport to be binding).
United
States v. Alston, 69 M.J. 214 (the MCM
expressly notes that its listing of
lesser included offenses is not all-inclusive).
United
States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138 (the President
has well-established authority
within the military justice system to clarify or give meaning to the
UCMJ
through promulgation of the Discussion and Analysis sections of the
MCM; the
President’s analysis of the punitive articles is persuasive, but not
binding,
authority; moreover, where the President’s narrowing construction is
favorable
to an accused and is not inconsistent with the language of a statute,
the
President’s narrowing construction, which is an appropriate Executive
branch
limitation on the conduct subject to prosecution, will not be disturbed
on
appeal).
United
States v. Matthews, 68 M.J. 29 (it is a well
established rule that principles
of statutory construction are used in construing the Military Rules of
Evidence; when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of
the courts
- at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd -
is to
enforce it according to its terms; in construing the language of a
statute or
rule, it is generally understood that the words should be given their
common
and approved usage).
United
States v. Custis, 65 M.J. 366 (it is a well
established rule that principles
of statutory construction are used in construing the MCM in general and
the MREs
in particular; when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function
of the
courts -- at least where the disposition required by the text is not
absurd --
is to enforce it according to its terms).
2007
United
States v. Taylor, 64 M.J. 416 (in construing the
language of a rule, it is generally understood that the words should be
given their common and approved usage).
2002
United
States v. Czeschin, 56 MJ 346 (the President’s
interpretations of substantive offenses in Part IV of the Manual are
not
binding on the judiciary, which has the responsibility to interpret
substantive
offenses under the Code; however, the President may issue rules in Part
IV and
has the authority to grant greater rights under Part IV than might be
provided
by statute).
2000
United
States v. Tualla, 52 MJ 228 (for purposes of
interpreting the
Manual, Executive acquiescence in the Court’s interpretation of a
provision
over an extended period of time is entitled to great weight in light of
the
relative ease with which the Manual can be amended).