2010 (September Term)
United States v. Hull, 70 M.J. 145 (requests for a new trial, and thus rehearings and reopenings of trial proceedings, are generally disfavored, and are granted only if a manifest injustice would result absent a new trial, rehearing, or reopening based on proffered newly discovered evidence).
2008 (Transition)
(a military judge does not
have authority under
Article 73, UCMJ, to order a new trial).
(prior to authentication, a
military judge has
authority under Article 39(a), UCMJ, and RCM 1102(b)(2) to convene a
post-trial
session to consider newly discovered evidence and to take whatever
remedial
action is appropriate).
(a military judge did not
abuse her discretion
in ordering a new trial in a drug use case where the government failed
to
disclose impeachment evidence concerning the witness who was assigned
as the
observer of the accused’s provision of a urine sample for drug testing;
evidence that the observer, a link in the chain of custody, had
received
nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 for dishonesty may have raised
serious
questions in the minds of the factfinder concerning the identity of the
urine
tested and whether it was unaltered when it was tested; this point may
have
borne extra weight with the factfinder where the government expressly
prohibited having such persons serve as observers; alone or in
conjunction with
the accused’s denial of use, this evidence may have raised reasonable
doubt in
the factfinders’ minds as to the accused’s guilt; furthermore, the
possession
of this evidence may have altered the accused’s trial strategy -- he
may not
have testified; under all of these circumstances, the military judge
cannot be
faulted for concluding that it was probable that had the prosecution
provided
the nonjudicial punishment to the defense, it would have produced a
substantially more favorable result for the accused -- in other words,
it
undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial; accordingly, in this
case,
the government’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence affecting a
witness’s
credibility that the accused specifically asked the government to
disclose was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
2007
United
States v. Albaaj, 65 M.J. 167 (in determining
whether a new trial is warranted when there is an allegation that a
juror failed to disclose information during voir dire, a party must
first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material
question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause).
(when a panel member failed to disclose that he knew the accused’s
brother, who was a defense witness on both the merits and sentencing,
this failure to disclose constituted juror misconduct and warranted a
new trial; by failing to correct the misinformation he had given
earlier during voir dire, the member violated his duty of candor; as a
result of the panel member’s nondisclosure, appellant’s defense counsel
was unaware of the relationship between the panel member and the
accused’s brother during the trial when he could have made further
inquiry into the nature of the relationship; as a result of that
inquiry, he could have moved for a mistrial or asked that the panel
member be removed from the panel prior to deliberations, either for
cause or on the basis that he would have exercised his peremptory
challenge against the member had he been aware of the relationship;
therefore, the member’s failure to disclose information was material to
the conduct of a fair and impartial trial; in addition, the evidence
from the DuBay hearing reflected that the panel member had
prior work-related contact with the accused’s brother and had made
critical statements about him and questioned his honesty; also in
dealing with a witness who is a brother of the accused, there is a risk
that the member might impart his feelings about the witness to the
accused; when viewed objectively, the circumstances of the relationship
combined with the member’s failure to disclose it to the military judge
injure the perception of fairness in the military justice system; most
members in the same position would be prejudiced or biased; therefore,
a valid basis for an implied bias challenge of the member was
established; accordingly, the two-prong new trial test has been
satisfied).
2005
United
States v. Meghdadi, 60 M.J. 438 (we have long recognized that
petitions for
a new trial are generally disfavored and that granting a petition for a
new
trial in the military rests within the sound discretion of the
authority
considering that petition; relief is granted only if a manifest
injustice would
result absent a new trial based on proffered newly discovered
evidence).
(although
we
have not directly addressed the standard to be applied in examining a
military
judge’s denial of a request for a post-trial Article 39(a) session, we
have
held that when an appellant requests the convening authority to order a
post-trial Article 39(a) session, it is a matter for the convening
authority’s
sound discretion whether to grant the request, and that we review a
military
judge’s ruling on a petition for a new trial for abuse of that
discretion).
(in
denying a
petition for a new trial, a military judge abuses his discretion if the
findings of fact upon which he predicates his ruling are not supported
by
evidence of record; if incorrect legal principles were used by him in
deciding
this motion; or if his application of the correct legal principles to
the facts
of a particular case is clearly unreasonable; while this standard is
not
facially applicable to the military judge’s denial of appellant’s
request for an
Article 39(a) session, the fact that the request was made in the
context of a
motion for new trial compels our consideration of this analytical
framework in
assessing the military judge’s factual and legal conclusions).
(in
denying
appellant’s motion for a post-trial Article 39(a) session to consider
whether a
mistrial or new trial should be granted, the military judge
misapprehended the
purpose of the Article 39(a) session, made factual findings that were
not
supported by the record, applied an erroneous legal standard,
misperceived the
evidentiary value of an audiotape, made no record of any weighing of
the new
evidence against the evidence at trial, either on the merits or in
sentencing,
and failed adequately to address appellant’s claim that fraud on the
court
allegedly perpetrated by a government witness had a substantial
contributing
effect on the sentence adjudged; further, on an issue related
entirely to
witness credibility, the military judge declined the opportunity
personally to
hear the testimony of witnesses and, in the process, denied counsel the
opportunity to develop that testimony in an adversarial forum; viewing
these
circumstances in the aggregate, we conclude that the military judge’s
reasons
and ruling were clearly untenable and that they constitute a
prejudicial abuse
of discretion).
United
States v. Sonego, 61 M.J. 1 (to obtain a new trial due to an
incorrect voir
dire response, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to
answer
honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a
correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause).
(where
a party
asserts juror nondisclosure during voir dire as a ground for a new
trial, the
normal procedure is to remand the issue to the trial court for
resolution; an
evidentiary hearing is the appropriate forum in which to develop the
full
circumstances surrounding each part of the new trial test).
(although
an
evidentiary hearing is the usual procedure for resolving claims of
juror
dishonesty, the measure of proof required to trigger such an
evidentiary
hearing is a colorable claim of juror bias; the “colorable claim” test
eliminates frivolous claims but keeps the door open for claims that may
prove
valid upon further examination).
(a
colorable claim of juror dishonesty was made in this case where an
officer of
the court declared under penalty of perjury that a panel member
provided a
contradictory voir dire response on a critical issue less than one
month after
appellant’s trial).
United
States v. Johnson, 61 M.J. 195 (Art. 73, UCMJ, allows petitions for
new
trials on the grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the
court).
(requests
for a
new trial, and thus rehearings and reopenings of trial proceedings, are
generally disfavored; relief is granted only if a manifest injustice
would
result absent a new trial, rehearing, or reopening based on proferred
newly
discovered evidence).
(when presented with a petition for new trial,
the reviewing
court must make a credibility determination, insofar as it must
determine
whether the newly discovered evidence, if considered by a court-martial
in the
light of all other pertinent evidence, would probably produce a
substantially
more favorable result for the accused; the reviewing court does not
determine
whether the proferred evidence is true; nor does it determine the
historical
facts; it merely decides if the evidence is sufficiently believable to
make a
more favorable result probable).
(when petitions for a new trial are submitted,
this Court
has the prerogative of weighing testimony at trial against the
post-trial
evidence to determine which is credible; consistent with federal
civilian
practice, this Court may review the evidence both in terms of
credibility as
well as of materiality; in determining whether evidence is material,
this Court
looks at the importance of the issue for which the evidence was offered
in
relation to the other issues in the case; the extent to which this
issue is in
dispute; and the nature of other evidence in the case pertaining to
this
issue).
(the
denial of
the accused’s request for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence was
not an abuse of discretion where the evidence did not offer some new
version of
the facts presented at trial and where additional impeachment material
and
potential perjury by witnesses would probably not have produced a
substantially
more favorable result for the accused).
United
States v. Harris, 61 M.J. 391 (petitions for new trials are
disfavored in
the law; relief is granted only to avoid a manifest injustice).
(RCM
1210, the
rule on petitions for new trial, expressly precludes its application to
guilty
pleas).
2004
United
States v. Cuento, 60 MJ 106 (petitions for new
trial
based on a witness’s recantation are not viewed favorably in the law;
they
should not be granted unless the court is reasonably well satisfied
that the
testimony given by a material witness is false; recantations of trial
testimony
are viewed by federal courts with extreme suspicion).
(when
the
alleged perjurer is the prosecutrix herself, we remain disinclined to
burden
appellant with a mechanical application of the rigorous new trial
standard;
under the unique circumstances of this case, including the lack of any
corroborating physical evidence, that appellant, both before and during
trial,
recanted his prior
2002
United
States v. Humpherys, 57 MJ 83 (petitions for a new
trial
are generally disfavored, and a decision on a petition for a new trial
rests
within the sound discretion of the authority considering that
petition).
(a military judge’s ruling on a petition for a new trial for is
reviewed for
abuse of discretion).
(the military judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that
appellant
was not entitled to a new trial for panel members’ failure to disclose
information about a superior/subordinate relationship where a full
evidentiary
hearing on the record made clear that the relationship between superior
and
rated subordinate was entirely professional, did not involve any
negative
aspects between them, and would not hamper subordinate's independent
thinking
and fulfillment of his responsibility as a panel member).
(military judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that
appellant was
not entitled to a new trial based upon panel member’s failure to
disclose
information about a superior/subordinate relationship during voir
dire
where accurate responses by these members would not have provided a
valid basis
for a challenge for cause against either or both).
1999