2023 (October Term)
United States v. Leipart, 85 M.J. 35 (a military judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly, absent clear evidence to the contrary).
(the presumption that the military judge knows and follows the law is only as valid as the law itself).
United States v. Armstrong, 85 M.J. 31 (there is a strong presumption that a judge is impartial, and a party seeking to demonstrate bias must overcome a high hurdle, particularly when the alleged bias involves actions taken in conjunction with judicial proceedings).
United States v. Tapp, 85 M.J. 19 (to prove judicial bias, a party must overcome a high hurdle because there exists a strong presumption that a judge is impartial).
2018 (October Term)
United States v. Lewis, 78 M.J. 447 (a military judge is allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented).
2014 (September Term)
United States v. Norman, 74 M.J. 144 (an unconstitutional presumptive conclusion arises when the military judge instructs members that they must conclude that evidence of the charged conduct also satisfies the terminal element; such an instruction is unconstitutional because it relieves the government of its burden of proof, subverts the presumption of innocence accorded to accused persons, and also invades the truth-finding task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases).
2013 (September Term)
United States v. Elespuru, 73 M.J. 326 (a waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege; there is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, although no magic words are required to establish a waiver; the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case).
2010 (September Term)
United States v. Phillips, 70 M.J. 161 (the use of conclusive presumptions to establish the elements of an offense is unconstitutional because such presumptions conflict with the presumption of innocence and invade the province of the trier of fact).
(a presumption that possession of child pornography is conclusively service discrediting under clause 2 of Article 134, UCMJ, is constitutionally impermissible).
2008 (September Term)
United
States v. Collier, 67 M.J. 347 (members are
presumed to follow a military
judge’s instructions to consider evidence for a proper purpose, such as
bias or
motive to misrepresent, and not let personal beliefs or feelings affect
their
determinations about witness credibility).
United
States v. Riddle, 67 M.J. 335 (a military
judge can presume, in the absence
of contrary circumstances, that the accused is sane and, furthermore,
that
counsel is competent).
2008 (Transition)
United States
v. Larson,
66 M.J. 212 (under MRE 314(d), a person, under normal circumstances, is
presumed not to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in government
property
that is not issued for personal use; the presumption that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in government property, however, is
rebuttable).
United
States v. Glenn, 66 M.J. 64 (an accused is
presumed to be sane and counsel
is presumed to be competent).
2007
United States v. Moran, 65 M.J. 178 (an inference of
guilt stemming from the accused shaving all of his body hair after
learning that investigators wished to procure a hair sample from him to
test for drug use was permissible under the consciousness of guilt
doctrine; there exists longstanding precedent that, while such behavior
may not give rise to a presumption of guilt, it nonetheless can, within
certain constraints, be entered into evidence and commented upon;
moreover, the effect of the accused shaving his body in this case was
essentially the destruction of evidence; that an inference of
consciousness of guilt can be drawn from the destruction of evidence is
well-recognized in the law).
2005
United
States
v. Deisher,
61 M.J.
313 (an order is presumed to be lawful, and
the
accused bears the burden of rebutting the presumption).
2003
United
States v. Kaiser, 58 MJ 146 (in strict legal
terms, the
presumption of innocence flows from the fundamental right to a fair
trial; the
right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the
Fourteenth
Amendment; the presumption of innocence, although not articulated in
the
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal
justice).
(the presumption of innocence is a longstanding feature of both
military and
civilian law; it is a critical part of our tradition of justice and
deeply
imbedded in our culture as well as our systems of justice; as reflected
in the
language of Article 51(c)(1), UCMJ, the presumption of innocence is
directly
related to the requirement that guilt be established by legal and
competent
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; put another way, the presumption of
innocence embodies the principle that one accused of a crime is
entitled to
have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the
evidence
introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion,
indictment,
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at
trial).
United
States v. McCollum, 58 MJ 323 (marital
communications are
presumptively confidential; therefore, once the party asserting the
marital
communications privilege establishes the existence of a private
communication
between spouses who are not separated, the burden of production shifts
to the
opposing party to overcome the presumption of confidentiality).
(even though marital communications are presumed to be confidential,
several
factors are relevant in determining whether that presumption has been
overcome:
(1) the nature of the circumstances; (2) the substance of the
communication;
(3) the existence or nonexistence of an expressed timeline or
particular plan
for disclosure; and (4) whether the statement is actually shared with a
third
party).
2002
United
States v. Quintanilla, 56 MJ 37 (there is a strong
presumption that a judge is impartial, and a party seeking to
demonstrate bias
must overcome a high hurdle; remarks, comments, or rulings of a judge
do not
constitute bias or partiality unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible).
United
States v. Ellis, 57 MJ 375 (an adverse inference
instruction is an appropriate curative measure for improper destruction
of
evidence).
United
States v. Washington, 57 MJ 394 (the presumption
of
innocence is set forth in the statutory requirement that, prior to
findings,
the members of a court-martial must be instructed that the accused must
be
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established by legal and
competent
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; although not literally employing a
presumption, the instruction reminds the members of the critical fact
that the
accused, as a matter of law, is innocent unless the members are
satisfied the
prosecution has proved each required element of the offense beyond a
reasonable
doubt; practically, the presumption of innocence serves to underscore
the
instruction that the members may not presume that the defendant is
guilty
simply because charges have been referred to trial).
2001
United States v. New, 55 MJ 95 (orders are clothed
with an inference of lawfulness).
2000
United
States v. Ayers, 54 MJ 85 (a general regulation is
entitled to a presumption of regularity if it appears regular on its
face).
(to support the inference of wrongful use of drugs, the prosecution’s expert testimony must show: (1) that the metabolite is not naturally produced by the body or any substance other than the drug in question; (2) that the cutoff level and reported concentration are high enough to reasonably discount the possibility of unknowing ingestion and to indicate a reasonable likelihood that the user at some time would have experienced the physical and psychological effects of the drug; and (3) that the testing methodology reliably detected the presence and reliably quantified the concentration of the drug or metabolite in the sample).
United States v. McDaniels, 50 MJ 407 (orders requiring the performance of military duties are presumed to be lawful when issued by superiors, but that order must relate to a military duty. See para. 14c(2)(a)(i) and (iii), Part IV, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.)).
United States v. Bertie,
50 MJ 489 (Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces not inclined to
recognize presumption that improper considerations of grade and rank
were purposefully utilized by convening authority to stack courts based
upon the composition of appellant’s court-martial and that of other
panels within the command).