2021 (October Term)
United States v. Beauge, 82 M.J. 157 (the right to cross-examine a witness for impeachment purposes has constitutional underpinnings because of the right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and the due process right to present a complete defense).
2010 (September Term)
United States v. Savala, 70 M.J. 70 (the CCA did not clearly err in concluding that the prosecution opened the door to cross-examination of the victim with respect to a prior complaint of sexual assault that the defense contended was fabricated to protect her reputation, where the prosecution introduced evidence of the victim’s prior complaint to bolster her credibility with respect to the reasons for her delayed reporting of the charged offense, thereby benefiting the prosecution).
(issues of witness credibility and motive are matters for the members to decide).
2008 (September Term)
United
States v. Collier, 67 M.J. 347 (the exposure of
a witness’s motivation in
testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected
right of cross-examination).
(through cross-examination, an
accused can
expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness).
(the right of
cross-examination is not
unlimited; the accused’s confrontation right does not give, for
example, free
license to cross-examine a witness to such an extent as would hammer
the point
home to the jury).
(whether sufficient
cross-examination has been
permitted depends on whether the witness’s motivation for testifying
has already
been exposed and further inquiry would be marginally relevant at best
and
potentially misleading).
(the military judge erred in
prohibiting
appellant’s defense counsel from cross-examining the main government
witness
about an alleged homosexual romantic relationship between the witness
and
appellant and from introducing extrinsic evidence of such a
relationship; the
military judge’s ruling prevented appellant’s counsel from fully
exploring this
government witness’s bias and motive to misrepresent the truth and
precluded
appellant from presenting her theory of the case; while the military
judge did
permit cross-examination about a close friendship between the two,
appellant
wanted to show that their relationship went beyond friendship, to a
sexual and
romantic relationship that lasted four months, during which time they
lived
together, and that the witness framed appellant for larceny as a result
of
their romantic relationship ending badly; it is intuitively obvious
that there
is a qualitative difference between the breakup of a friendship and a
badly
ended romantic relationship, whether that romantic relationship was
sexual or
not; the romantic nature of a relationship has a special relevance to
motivation such that allowing additional cross-examination in that area
is not
a mere opportunity to hammer the point home to the members; if the
members had
been given evidence of a sexual and romantic relationship between the
witness
and appellant, they might have had a significantly different impression
of the
witness’s credibility; as such, the military judge’s ruling was a
violation of
appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against her).
(the military judge’s
exclusion of evidence
that the main government witness was biased because of her prior
homosexual
romantic relationship between her and appellant, on the ground that
cross-examining the witness about such a relationship would entail
harassment
or undue embarrassment, lacked an articulated or supportable legal
basis and was
thus an abuse of discretion, where the military judge made no findings
about
the likelihood that the witness would suffer from undue embarrassment
or
harassment as a result of cross-examination or the presentation of bias
evidence and where there was no evidence that trial defense counsel
planned to
conduct cross-examination in a threatening or embarrassing manner).
(the military judge’s
exclusion of evidence
that the main government witness was biased because of her prior
homosexual
romantic relationship between her and appellant, on the ground that
cross-examining the witness about such a relationship would lead to a
waste of
time and a confusion of the issues, lacked an articulated or
supportable legal
basis and thus was an abuse of discretion, where the military judge
made no
factual findings about any delay or confusion that could result from
the
cross-examination of the witness or the presentation of extrinsic
evidence on
the question, and where the defense counsel only planned to ask the
witness
about the relationship and, if she denied it existed, to ask two
additional
witnesses, one of whom ultimately testified at the court-martial; the
record did
not support the military judge’s decision to take the ultimate
questions -
whether that relationship existed and whether it led the witness to lie
- away
from the members; having found that appellant made a threshold showing
there
was some evidence of such a relationship, it was for the members, as
the triers
of fact, to decide if a relationship existed and if its end caused the
witness
to be biased or to misrepresent).