2021 (October Term)
United States v. Quezada, 82 M.J. 54 (propensity evidence is a generally impermissible form of character evidence in which members prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character).
2013 (September Term)
United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33 (the authority to introduce character evidence under MRE 608(a) does not extend to human lie detector testimony).
2008 (September Term)
United
States v. Burton, 67 M.J. 150 (an accused may
not be convicted of a crime based on a general criminal disposition).
(the government may not
introduce similarities
between a charged offense and prior conduct, whether charged or
uncharged, to
show modus operandi or propensity without using a specific exception
within our
rules of evidence, such as MRE 404 or 413 [allowing character evidence
when
offered first by the accused, allowing evidence of other crimes to show
motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of
mistake, and allowing evidence of prior sexual assaults when the
accused is
charged with a sexual assault offense]; it follows, therefore, that
portions of
a closing argument encouraging a panel to focus on such similarities to
show
modus operandi and propensity, when made outside the ambit of these
exceptions,
are not a reasonable inference fairly derived from the evidence, and
are
improper).
2007
(in a murder case based on
the shaken baby syndrome, testimony by an expert witness in the fields
of developmental and forensic psychiatry that the most common person to
fatally abuse a child is a biological parent and that the most common
trigger for baby shakings is persistent crying, was inadmissible
profile evidence that focused on characteristics of the abuser, as
opposed to characteristics of the child).
(in a murder case based on the
shaken baby syndrome, testimony by an expert witness in the fields of
developmental and forensic psychiatry about the symptoms and
progression of shaken baby syndrome and her medical conclusion that the
victim’s primary diagnosis was probably most consistent with an
inflicted injury, was not inadmissible profile evidence; the evidence
regarding the progressions and symptoms of shaken baby syndrome focused
on the characteristics of the child, not the abuser; and the evidence
was not profile evidence simply because it tended to incriminate the
accused).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (profile evidence
is defined as evidence that presents a characteristic profile of an
offender, such as a pedophile or child abuser, and then places the
accused’s personal characteristics within that profile as proof of
guilt; generally, the use of any profile characteristic as evidence of
guilt or innocence is improper at a criminal trial).
2006
United
States v. Moss, 63 M.J. 233 (MRE 608(c)
allows for evidence to show bias,
prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent through the examination of
witnesses
or extrinsic evidence; rules of evidence should be read to allow
liberal
admission of bias-type evidence; when the military judge excludes
evidence of
bias, the exclusion raises issues regarding an accused’s Sixth
Amendment right
to confrontation).
(the use of
extrinsic evidence to show bias,
prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent can be limited if it is
collateral to
an important trial issue or its relevance is not established).
(the partiality
of a witness is always
relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony).
(evidence that
alleged child victim had been
beaten by her mother, had used alcohol and drugs, had been expelled
from
school, had attempted suicide, had committed general acts of
disobedience, and
was unhappy with her restrictive home environment was relevant and
admissible pursuant
to MRE 608(c) to show bias and motive to misrepresent at the accused’s
court-martial
on charges of rape, forcible sodomy, and indecent acts; the evidence
supported the
viable defense theory that the victim had fabricated the alleged rape
to cast
herself as a victim to gain favorable treatment from her parents, to
improve
her relationship with them, to change her own present circumstances,
and to
deflect attention and focus away from herself and her misbehavior; a
reasonable
juror could have been convinced by the defense’s theory that the
alleged child
victim had a motive to fabricate a story and could have, therefore,
formed a
significantly different impression of the alleged child victim’s
credibility).
(admission of
specific acts of bias is
dependent upon the military judge properly evaluating the evidence’s
probative
value against its potential for unfair prejudice as measured by MRE
403).
2005
United
States v. Brewer, 61
M.J. 425 (in a use-of-drugs case, where the accused sought to present
evidence
of innocent ingestion through the testimony of witnesses who were with
him and
observed his behavior for much of the relevant time frame and saw no
evidence
of drug use, this evidence was not admissible as character evidence
under MRE
404 and 405 because character was not an essential element of that
defense).
United
States v. Hays, 62 M.J. 158 (profile evidence is evidence that
presents a
characteristic profile of an offender, such as a pedophile or child
abuser, and
then places the accused’s personal characteristics within that profile
as proof
of guilt; generally, use of any characteristic profile as evidence of
guilt or
innocence in criminal trials is improper).
(in this judge-alone trial,
even if the
expert testimony of the government’s witness constituted improper
profile
evidence regarding the behavioral aspects of persons who sexually abuse
children, there was no prejudice to the accused because the military
judge, who
understood the witness’s testimony as simply interpreting the language
of an
e-mail sent by the accused, did not treat the testimony as profile
evidence or
give it any prejudicial weight in that regard).
2002
United
States v. Humpherys, No. 01-0426, 57 MJ 83 (Mil.R.Evid.
404(a)(1)
allows the accused to present evidence of his good military character
if that
trait is pertinent to the charged offense; the rule also allows the
government
to present character evidence in rebuttal of the
good-military-character
evidence presented by the defense).
(extrinsic evidence of prior acts of misconduct is not admissible to
rebut
opinion evidence of good military character).
2001
United
States v. Catrett, 55 MJ 400 (the military judge
is
charged with deciding whether a party has established a sufficient
foundation
for admission of opinion evidence concerning a person’s character; the
military
judge has considerable discretion in this regard).
(the military judge did not abuse her discretion in permitting a
civilian to
testify about appellant’s military character where some foundation was
established by evidence that: (1) the witness’ father had been in the
military;
(2) the witness grew up on the "civil service side" of the military
community; and (3) the witness had regular contact with the military
and its
personnel in various capacities).
United
States v. Dimberio, 56 MJ 20 (circumstantial use
of
character evidence is impermissible except for three exceptions:
(1) an
accused may introduce pertinent evidence of good character, in which
event the
prosecution may rebut with evidence of bad character; (2) an
accused may
introduce pertinent evidence of the character of the victim, and the
prosecution may introduce similar evidence in rebuttal of the character
evidence; and (3) the character of a witness may be gone into as
bearing on his
credibility).
(whenever evidence of character or a trait of character of a person
is
admissible, proof may be made by testimony in the form of an opinion
(Mil.R.Evid. 405(a)); in this case, the Court assumes that the
definition of
character evidence is broad and includes psychiatric diagnosis or
personality
disorders).
(although expert opinion evidence of a psychiatric diagnosis or
personality
disorder does not fit within the exceptions noted in Mil.R.Evid.
404(a), the
accused nonetheless has a constitutional right to introduce the
evidence if it
is otherwise legally and logically relevant under Mil.R.Evid. 401-403).
(rules
such as
Mil.R.Evid.
403 and 404(a) that exclude evidence from criminal trials do not
abridge an
accused’s constitutional right to present a defense so long as they are
not
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve and do
not infringe upon a weighty constitutional interest of the accused).
2000
United
States v. Matthews, No. 53 MJ 465 (extrinsic evidence
of
specific acts is not admissible to rebut evidence of good military
character).
(although cross-examination of character witnesses about specific
acts is
permissible under MRE 405(a), that cross-examination should be limited
to acts
that would have occurred prior to the crime charged, because the court
wants to
test character at that time).
United
States v. Jenkins, 54 MJ 12 (MRE 608(a) permits
the
credibility of a witness to be supported or attacked by opinion
evidence, but
that opinion evidence may refer only to the witness’ character for
truthfulness
or untruthfulness; a witness may not, however, opine that another
witness is
lying or telling the truth).
United
States v. Reed, 54 MJ 37 (while good military
character
may be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt, there is nothing which
requires
a Court of Criminal Appeals to make a finding that such evidence is not
cogent
or irresistible in reviewing a case under Article 66).
1999
United
States v. Graham, 50 MJ 56 (four year old positive
urinalysis
does not fit any of the recognized exceptions to MRE 404(b) prohibition
against
prior bad conduct).