2021 (October Term)
United States v. Hiser, 82 M.J. 60 (unless properly withdrawn or ordered stricken from the record, a stipulation of fact that has been accepted is binding on the court-martial and may not be contradicted by the parties thereto).
United States v. Moratalla, 82 M.J. 1 (because a stipulation of fact is binding on the court-martial and may not be contradicted by the parties, an appellate court accepts as true all of the facts, but not necessarily the legal conclusions, contained in the parties’ stipulation).
2020 (October Term)
United States v. Castro, 81 M.J. 209 (unless properly withdrawn or ordered stricken from the record, a stipulation of fact that has been accepted is binding on the court-martial and may not be contradicted by the parties thereto).
(ownership of property is not purely a question of fact because ownership ultimately depends upon legal principles; however, the practical reality is that most facts regarding common transactions in property (e.g., whether someone bought goods, possessed goods, owned goods, or sold goods) have some legal component to them and yet are customarily treated as facts susceptible to stipulation).
(parties may stipulate to facts that are legally possible; and if an appellant has not shown that the facts are legally impossible, then under RCM 811(e), then the court must accept the facts as true without obliging the parties to demonstrate why they are true).
United States v. Simpson, 81 M.J. 33 (unless properly withdrawn or ordered stricken from the record, a stipulation of fact that has been accepted is binding on the court-martial and may not be contradicted by the parties thereto).
(an appellate court does not automatically accept legal conclusions in a stipulation of facts as true).2008 (September Term)
United
States v. Campos, 67 M.J. 330 (entering into a
stipulation of expected
testimony is not necessarily the equivalent of consenting to the
admission of
the testimony).
(in this case, appellant, who
as part of a
negotiated pretrial agreement, entered into a stipulation of expected
testimony
of a psychologist who had expertise in evaluating and treating sexual
offenders, waived any right to claim error on the ground that the
witness did
not personally appear to present live testimony at sentencing in a
child
pornography prosecution, where the stipulation amounted to an agreement
between
appellant, defense counsel, and trial counsel that if the witness were
called
to testify, he would testify under oath as reflected in the document,
the
military judge provided appellant with a detailed explanation of the
stipulation, appellant agreed to the “use of” the stipulation, and
defense
counsel represented that he desired to enter into the stipulation).
(after appellant in a child pornography
prosecution entered into a stipulation of expected testimony of a
psychologist
who had expertise in evaluating and treating sexual offenders, defense
counsel
waived the issue of admissibility of the substance of the stipulation
at
sentencing by answering “no” when the military judge asked for
objections;
although the stipulation did not expressly consent to the admission of
the
witness’s testimony, defense counsel had advance notice of the
substance of the
testimony, reviewed the expected testimony, and considered the impact
of the
stipulation on appellant’s case).
United
States v. Fisher, 58 MJ 300 (unless withdrawn or
stricken,
an admission in a stipulation of fact is binding on the court-martial
and may
not be contradicted by the parties).
2002
United
States v. Terlep, 57 MJ 344 (R.C.M. 811(e)
precludes the
Government from evidencing facts at a court-martial which
"contradict" those agreed to in an accepted stipulation of fact;
however, this rule says nothing about precluding the parties from
presenting
evidence which "goes beyond" the facts in the stipulation;
stipulations of fact do not prohibit proof of facts which are neither
designated nor necessarily implied in the stipulation).
(the victim’s testimony did not so contradict the stipulation of
fact in
this case: (1) this stipulation of fact did not expressly state that a
rape did
not occur that night; (2) the stipulation of fact did not expressly
provide
that appellant’s assault with his hands on the victim’s "legs,"
"torso," and "breasts" were the only touchings that
occurred that night; (3) it was not necessarily inferable from the
sexual
assaults stipulated to that a rape did not also occur; and (4) defense
counsel,
without caveat, indicated his understanding that the stipulation of
fact was
limited in nature and the parties had additional evidence as to the
events of
that evening).
(RCM 811(e) did not prohibit trial counsel from presenting evidence
as to
aggravating facts not expressly or implicitly covered by this
stipulation;
argument as to the occurrence of a rape not particularly addressed in
the
stipulation was also not prohibited).
2000