2001
United
States v. Vasquez, 54 MJ 303 (Mil. R. Evid. 410 is
generally taken from Fed. R. Evid 410, but is broader because it
encompasses
statements made in connection with a request for administrative
disposition in
lieu of court-martial).
(an excessively formalistic or technical approach to Mil. R. Evid.
410 may
undermine the policy of the rule to encourage the flow of information
during
the plea-bargaining process).
(Mil. R. Evid. 410 does not require that protected plea bargaining
statements be related to offenses pending before the court-martial at
which
they are offered).
(under Mil. R. Evid. 410, appellant’s admission of guilt in
conjunction with
a request for administrative separation in lieu of court martial was
not
admissible even though those statements related to an offense not
pending
before the court-martial; those statements related to an absence
offense which
was still pending in the sense that the government remained free to
prosecute appellant
until jurisdiction terminated by virtue of appellant’s discharge).
United
States v. Anderson, 55 MJ 182 (the protections of
Mil. R.
Evid. 410 are not limited to plea-bargaining statements that relate
only to the
offenses pending before the court-martial at which they are offered).
(under Mil. R. Evid. 420, charges are pending until an appellant
receives
the quid pro quo for his admission of guilt made to obtain a discharge
in lieu
of trial: an executed discharge).
(Mil. R. Evid. 410 must be interpreted broadly in order to carry out
the
policy underlying the rule, which is to encourage the flow of
information
during the plea-bargaining process).
(even though it was a personnel record, a document purporting to
approve an
accused’s request for discharge in lieu of court-martial on other
charges was
inadmissible during sentencing under Mil. R. Evid. 410: (1) the
document
reflected that appellant had bargained for disposition of the earlier
charges
without trial; (2) the request for discharge was tantamount to a
statement
because an admission of guilt was an integral part of the discharge
process;
and (3) because the administrative discharge was not executed and
appellant had
not received the benefit of his bargain in the earlier case, those
earlier
charges were still pending).