2012 (September Term)
United States v. Bennitt, 72 M.J. 266 (any servicememmber who, without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being (1) by culpable negligence, or (2) while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an offense, other than those named in [Article 118(4), UCMJ], directly affecting the person, is guilty of involuntary manslaughter).
(a conviction for involuntary manslaughter cannot be sustained solely by evidence that an accused sold someone a drug and that the purchaser later died from an overdose of that drug; on the other hand, when the seller has gone further and assisted the purchaser in injecting or ingesting the drug, the sale becomes one which does directly affect the person for purposes of Article 119(b)(2)).
(with respect to manslaughter under Article 119(b)(2), UCMJ, offenses directly affecting the person are limited to those in which physical force is applied directly against an individual’s body).
(appellant’s conduct in crushing a pill containing an illegal drug that was then ingested by his civilian girlfriend, who then died from a drug overdose, could not support his conviction for involuntary manslaughter because his aiding and abetting of the victim’s wrongful drug use did not constitute physical assistance such that it was an offense directly affecting the person).
2010 (September Term)
70 M.J. 15
(negligent homicide is not an LIO of involuntary manslaughter;
prejudice to
good order and discipline and service discredit are not subsumed within
the
elements of involuntary manslaughter).
2008
(Transition)
United
States v. Miergrimado, 66 M.J. 34 (to sustain a
conviction for
attempted premeditated murder, the government must prove that at the
time of
the killing, the accused had a premeditated design to kill;
premeditated murder
is murder committed after the formation of a specific intent to kill
someone
and consideration of the act intended; the offense of voluntary
manslaughter,
on the other hand, requires the intent to kill or inflict great bodily
harm,
and does not require premeditation; thus, premeditation is a
distinguishing
factual element).
(the heat of passion caused by
adequate
provocation necessary for the offense of voluntary manslaughter may
result from
fear or rage; the provocation must be adequate to excite uncontrollable
passion
in a reasonable person, and the act of killing must be committed under
and
because of that passion; although a slight blow with the hand or fist
cannot
serve as adequate provocation, in certain circumstances, the unlawful
infliction of great bodily harm may constitute adequate provocation).
(the evidence in this case was
legally sufficient to support a finding that the crime of attempted
voluntary
manslaughter was committed in the heat of sudden passion caused by
adequate
provocation, where testimony from both the accused and the victim
established
that the two were insulting and swearing at each other before and
during their
fight and where testimony from the accused indicated that the victim
had hit
him several times and was coming after him again when he raised his
rifle and fired).
(the accused was provided fair
notice and adequate opportunity to defend on the lesser included
offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter, where the accused did not claim that
attempted voluntary manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of
the
charged offense of attempted premeditated murder, where during the
government’s
case-in-chief and prior to the accused’s testimony, the military judge
made it
clear that he intended to instruct on this lesser included offense and
gave
defense counsel the option to continue the case for several days, and
where
defense counsel accepted the additional time).
2003
United
States v. Riley, 58 MJ 305 (culpable negligence is
a
degree of carelessness greater than simple negligence; culpable
negligence is a
negligent act or omission accompanied by a culpable disregard for the
foreseeable consequences to others of that act or omission; an
objective test
is applied in determining whether the consequences of an act are
foreseeable).
(we are not satisfied that a reasonable factfinder could conclude
that
appellant’s negligence rose to the level of culpable negligence, i.e.,
a
culpable disregard for the foreseeable consequences to her baby; an
experienced
medical professional would be aware of the potential for an explosive
and
unexpected birth, sufficient to suddenly propel the baby onto the hard
floor,
and consequently would be likely to foresee death as a consequence of
appellant’s acts; this case, however, does not involve an experienced
medical
professional; instead, it involves an inexperienced, immature lay
person,
giving birth for the first time; we do not believe that a reasonable
factfinder
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant culpably
disregarded the
likelihood of the sudden and explosive birth of her baby and her baby’s
death
as a consequence of her acts; thus, we hold that the evidence in this
case was
legally insufficient to support a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter in
violation of Article 119, UCMJ, because a reasonable could not find a
culpable
disregard for the foreseeable consequences to others beyond a
reasonable
doubt).
2002
United
States v. Richards, 56 MJ 282 (active
participation in a beating that so incapacitated the victim and
rendered him
helpless against the attack is a satisfactory basis upon which a
rational
factfinder could have found that appellant's kicking aided and abetted
another’s actual killing the felled victim at some point during this
assault).
(as to appellant's intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm,
active
participation in a beating that so incapacitated the victim and
rendered him
helpless against the attack provides a legally sufficient basis upon
which the
members could have inferred that all of the assailants, including
appellant,
acted with such intent; appellant was an active, voluntary perpetrator
of the
assaultive kicking while the victim was on the ground for a number of
minutes,
and appellant voluntarily participated in a chain of events that
prevented the
victim’s escape).
(Article 119(a) does not require that appellant intended any
particular
means of inflicting death or great bodily harm but, rather, that he
intended
the consequence; the precise means by which the consequence of death
actually
was visited (a knife rather than the kicking) does not diminish
appellant’s
culpability for aiding and abetting a criminal assault "with an intent
to
kill or inflict great bodily harm.").
United
States v. Oxendine, 55 MJ 323 (culpable negligence
is
defined as a negligent act or omission accompanied by a culpable
disregard for
the foreseeable consequences to others of that act or omission).
(the basis of a charge of involuntary manslaughter may be a
negligent act or
omission which, when viewed in the light of human experience, might
foreseeably
result in the death of another).
(the test for foreseeability is whether a reasonable person, in view
of all
the circumstances, would have realized the substantial and unjustified
danger
created by his acts).
(having decided to participate with the deceased and other Marines
in a
dangerous joint enterprise, appellant was bound by the circumstances
that would
have put a reasonable person on notice as to the risk he was creating
or
helping to create, and the foreseeable consequences of that risk; it
was not
necessary the appellant himself be aware of the substantial risk he is
creating, but only that a reasonable person would have realized the
risk).
(a deceased’s negligence alone was not a superseding cause
sufficient to
create the proximate cause of his death required in the context of this
particular joint enterprise to exonerate appellant where the objective
of the
game could not be achieved but for the assistance of others holding the
deceased outside the window; thus, death would not have resulted had
appellant
not agreed to be the holder, at least as far as appellant’s liability
is concerned).
United
States v. Nelson, 53 MJ 319 (under Article 119(b),
culpable negligence arises only from a legal duty to act; when there is
no duty
to act, there can be no neglect).
(under Article 119(b), a parent is culpably negligent in failing to
provide
medical assistance when a reasonable person in such circumstances would
have
realized the substantial and unjustified danger created by his act).
(culpable negligence in fulfilling the parental duty to provide a
child with
medical assistance is a question of fact to be decided on the basis of
all applicable
evidence).