2018 (October Term)
United States v. Gonzales, 78 M.J. 480 (whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another offense is a question of law).
(in this case, at the time of trial, Article 79, UCMJ, authorized a court-martial to find the accused guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged; Article 79, UCMJ, now authorizes a court-martial to find the accused guilty not only of an offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged but also any lesser included offense so designated by regulation prescribed by the President).
(the elements test determines whether an offense is necessarily included in the offense charged; the elements test is applied in in two ways; the first way is by comparing the statutory definitions of the two offenses; an offense is a lesser included offense of the charged offense if each of its elements is necessarily also an element of the charged offense; the second way is by examining the specification of the charged offense; an offense can also be a lesser included offense of the charged offense if the specification of the charged offense is drafted in such a manner that it alleges facts that necessarily satisfy all the elements of each offense; the elements test requires a textual comparison of criminal statutes, not an alternative inherent relationship test, which would ask whether proof of the greater offense can generally be expected to require proof of the lesser offense).
(although the MCM’s listing of lesser included offenses is not controlling, an error in the MCM is a factor in determining whether an issue was subject to reasonable doubt).
2017 (October Term)
United States v. Armstrong, 77 M.J. 465 (Article 79, UCMJ, authorizes a court-martial to find the accused guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged; the theory of Article 79, UCMJ, is that the accused will have notice of an offense necessarily included in the charged offense because the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the greater offense alleged, thereby putting the accused on notice to be prepared to defend against the lesser offense in addition to the offense specifically charged; no article of the UCMJ, however, currently authorizes a court-martial to find the accused guilty of an offense that is not necessarily included in a charged offense).
(when the Military Justice Act of 2016 becomes effective, a court-martial will be authorized to find an accused guilty not only of an offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged but also any lesser included offense so designated by regulation prescribed by the President).
(it is error for the military judge to instruct the members that they may find the accused guilty of an offense that is not necessarily included of the offense charged).
(the elements test determines whether an offense is necessarily included in the offense charged under Article 79, UCMJ; the elements test is applied in two ways; the first way is by comparing the statutory definitions of the two offenses; an offense is a lesser included offense of the charged offense if each of its elements is necessarily also an element of the charged offense; the second way is by examining the specification of the charged offense; an offense can also be a lesser included offense of the charged offense if the specification of the charged offense is drafted in such a manner that it alleges facts that necessarily satisfy all the elements of each offense; if the elements test is satisfied in either way, the accused will have the notice necessary to prepare a defense).
(the elements test does not require the elements of the lesser and greater offense to be defined with identical statutory language).
2016 (October Term)
United States v. Oliver, 76 M.J. 271 (the rights at issue when determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another are constitutional in nature, as the due process principle of fair notice mandates that an accused has a right to know what offense and under what legal theory he will be convicted).
2015 (September Term)
United States v. Riggins, 75 M.J. 78 (under the particular circumstances of this case, where appellant was charged with two specifications of sexual assault and three specifications of abusive sexual contact under Article 120, UCMJ, by placing the alleged victim in fear that, through the use or abuse of military position, rank, or authority, he would affect her military career, and where the military judge convicted appellant of assault consummated by a battery under Article 128, UCMJ, as a lesser included offense of the sexual assault and abusive sexual contact offenses and found that although the alleged victim was not placed in fear of appellant affecting her military career, as charged, she instead was pressured in an unrelenting manner by a servicemember of superior rank into having sex, assault consummated by a battery was not a lesser included offense of the charged offenses; first, the Article 120, UCMJ, offenses with which appellant was originally charged did not require the government to prove a lack of consent, but the Article 128, UCMJ, offense of which appellant ultimately was convicted did; second, the original specifications did not include an element requiring that the bodily harm be done with unlawful force or violence, but the Article 128, UCMJ, offense of which appellant ultimately was convicted did; and third, appellant did not receive fair notice of what offense and under what legal theory he was tried and ultimately convicted; as such, appellant’s conviction for assault consummated by a battery violated his constitutional rights to notice and to not be convicted of a crime that is not a lesser included offense of the offenses with which he was charged).
(Article 79, UCMJ, permits an accused to be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged; this Article provides the statutory authority for a military judge to convict on, and an appellate court to affirm on, a lesser included offense).
2012 (September Term)
United States v. Tunstall, 72 M.J. 191 (a military judge can only instruct on a lesser included offense where the greater offense requires members to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the lesser violation).
(as charged in this case, indecent acts (committing a sexual act in an open and notorious manner) is not a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault (engaging in a sexual act with an incapacitated person)).
(an appellate court applies the elements test to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another; under the elements test, one compares the elements of each offense; if all of the elements of offense X are also elements of offense Y, then X is an LIO of Y; offense Y is called the greater offense because it contains all of the elements of offense X along with one or more additional elements).
(a factfinder must be able to rationally acquit on the greater offense but still convict on the lesser offense; the lesser offense must be included within but not, on the facts of the case, be completely encompassed by the greater; a lesser-included offense instruction is only proper where the charged greater offense requires the factfinder to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the lesser-included offense).
2010 (September Term)
United States v. Arriaga, 70 M.J. 51 (Article 79, UCMJ, states that an accused may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein).
(a court applies the elements test to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another; under the elements test, one compares the elements of each offense; if all of the elements of one offense are also elements of the charged offense, then the offense is a lesser included offense of the charged offense; the two offenses need not have identical statutory language; instead, the meaning of the offenses is ascertained by applying the normal principles of statutory construction).
(regardless of whether one looks strictly to the statutory elements or to the elements as charged, housebreaking is a lesser included offense of burglary; comparing the statutory elements, it is impossible to prove a burglary without also proving a housebreaking; furthermore, the offense as charged in this case clearly alleges the elements of both offenses; here, the “intent” element of burglary was charged as the intent to commit an offense under Article 120, UCMJ; that charging language also satisfies the “intent” element of housebreaking (intent to commit a criminal offense); while in another case it may be possible to prove a housebreaking offense by proving the intent to commit a criminal offense not designated in the third element of burglary, that is not the offense charged in this case; the offense as charged included all of the elements of housebreaking and all of those elements are also elements of burglary; housebreaking is therefore a lesser included offense of burglary).
(the fact that there may be an alternative means of satisfying an element in a lesser offense does not preclude it from being a lesser-included offense).
United
States v. Girouard, 70 M.J. 5 (Article 79, UCMJ,
provides the statutory
authority for a military judge to instruct on, and for an appellate
court to
affirm, an LIO).
(in
determining
whether an offense is an LIO, a court applies the elements test).
United
States v. Bonner, 70 M.J. 1 (an accused may be
found guilty of an offense
necessarily included in the offense charged; Article 79 requires
application of
the elements test to determine whether one offense is an LIO of a
charged
offense; under the elements test, the elements of the lesser offense
are a
subset of the elements of the charged offense; where the lesser offense
requires an element not required for the greater offense, no
instruction
regarding an LIO is to be given).
(the elements test to
determine whether one
offense is an LIO of a charged offense does not require that the two
offenses
at issue employ identical statutory language; instead, after applying
the
normal principles of statutory construction, a court asks whether the
elements
of the alleged LIO are a subset of the elements for the charged
offense; thus,
it first determines the elements of the charged offense and the alleged
LIO by
applying the principles of statutory construction; then, it compares
the
elements of the two offenses to see if the latter is a subset of the
former).
United
States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465 (an offense is
not necessarily included in, a
subset of, or an LIO of a charged greater offense when it has no
elements in
common with the elements of the charged offense but is nonetheless
either
listed as an LIO in the MCM or has been held by this Court to be an LIO
on some
other ground).
(the due process principle of
fair notice
mandates that an accused has a right to know what offense and under
what legal
theory he will be convicted; an LIO meets this notice requirement if it
is a
subset of the greater offense alleged; if indeed an LIO is a subset of
the
greater charged offense, the constituent parts of the greater and
lesser
offenses should be transparent, discernible ex ante, and extant in
every
instance).
(it is for Congress to define
criminal
offenses and their constituent parts; one offense either is or is not
an LIO,
necessarily included in another offense).
(in determining what
constitutes a
lesser-included offense in the military justice system, an appellate
court
applies the elements test and looks to whether the elements of the
purported
LIO are a subset of the elements of the charged offense; under the
elements
test, one compares the elements of each offense; if all of the elements
of
offense X are also elements of offense Y, then X is an LIO of Y;
offense Y is
called the greater offense because it contains all of the elements of
offense X
along with one or more additional elements).
(the Constitution requires that an accused be
on notice as to the offense that must be defended against, and that
only lesser
included offenses that meet these notice requirements may be affirmed
by an
appellate court).
(accuseds may be convicted of
uncharged LIOs precisely because they are deemed
to have notice).
(the offense of indecent acts is not an LIO of the offense of rape
because the
elements of rape do not include all (or indeed any) of the elements of
indecent
acts, notwithstanding that the accused may have been on notice of the
possibility that he might be convicted of such an LIO where (1) the
offense of
indecent acts was held to be an LIO of rape by the CAAF in US v.
Schoolfield,
40 MJ 132, and (2) the MCM listed the offense of indecent acts as an
LIO of
rape; to the extent that Schoolfield and US v. Hudson,
59 MJ 357,
hold otherwise, they are no longer good law).
(suggesting that listing a
criminal offense as an LIO within the MCM
automatically makes it one, irrespective of its elements, ignores the
very
definition of a crime).
(an LIO, the subset
necessarily included in
the greater offense, must be determined with reference to the elements
defined
by Congress for the greater offense; however, this opinion does not,
and should
not, be read to question the President’s ability to list examples of
offenses
with which one could be charged under Article 134, UCMJ; the President
in those
instances is not defining offenses but merely indicating various
circumstances
in which the elements of Article 134 could be met; the President’s
listing of
offenses under Article 134 is persuasive authority to the courts, and
offers
guidance to judge advocates under his command regarding potential
violations of
the article).
(interpreting Article 79, UCMJ, to require the
elements test for LIOs has the constitutionally sound consequence of
ensuring
that one can determine ex ante - solely from what one is charged with -
all
that one may need to defend against; this practice is surely preferable
and
more sound than judges at the trial and appellate levels making
subjective
judgments as to whether elements line up realistically).
2008 (Transition)
United
States v. Miergrimado, 66 M.J. 34 (Article 79,
UCMJ, which provides
that an accused may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included
in the
offense charged, puts a defense attorney on notice that a lesser
included
offense instruction may be given).
(the accused was provided fair
notice and adequate opportunity to defend on the lesser included
offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter, where the accused did not claim that
attempted voluntary manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of
the
charged offense of attempted premeditated murder, where during the
government’s
case-in-chief and prior to the accused’s testimony, the military judge
made it
clear that he intended to instruct on this lesser included offense and
gave
defense counsel the option to continue the case for several days, and
where
defense counsel accepted the additional time).
United
States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21 (a lesser
included offense is defined as an offense
necessarily included in the offense charged; any reviewing authority
with the
power to approve or affirm a finding of guilty may approve or affirm,
instead,
so much of the finding as includes a lesser included offense).
(to determine whether a
lesser offense is
necessarily included in the offense charged, an appellate court applies
the
elements test derived from US v. Schmuck, 489 US 705 (1989);
the
comparison to be drawn is between offenses; since offenses are
statutorily
defined, that comparison is appropriately conducted by reference to the
statutory elements of the offenses in question, and not, as the
inherent
relationship approach would mandate, by reference to conduct proved at
trial
regardless of the statutory definitions; one offense is not necessarily
included in another unless the elements of
the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense).
(clauses 1 and 2 of Article
134, UCMJ, are not
necessarily lesser included offenses of offenses alleged under clause 3
of
Article 134, UCMJ, although they may be, depending on the drafting of
the
specification).
(for the purposes of a guilty
plea under
Article 134, UCMJ, it is important for the accused to know whether he
or she is
pleading only to a crime or offense not capital under clause 3, a
disorder or
neglect under clause 1, conduct proscribed under clause 2, or all
three; as a result,
while it is appropriate for an
appellate court to affirm a lesser included offense, an accused has a
right to know to what offense and under what legal theory he or she is
pleading
guilty; this fair notice resides at the heart of the plea inquiry).
(where an offense is a lesser
included offense
of the charged offense to which appellant pleaded guilty, appellant is
by
definition on notice because it is a subset of the greater offense
alleged;
however, where a distinct offense is not inherently a lesser included
offense,
during the guilty plea inquiry, the military judge or the charge sheet
must
make the accused aware of any alternative theory of guilt to which he
is by
implication pleading guilty).
(in a contested case involving a guilty plea to a clause 3 offense
under Article 134, a reviewing court must consider whether or not the
prosecution proceeded on the premise or theory that
the conduct alleged
under clause 3 was also prejudicial to good order or service
discrediting in
order to affirm lesser included offenses under clauses 1 or 2 in the
event the
clause 3 theory is invalidated; in such a case, the members will
normally have
been instructed as to the alternative theory; this is consistent with
the principle
that an appellate court may not affirm on a theory not presented to the
trier
of fact and adjudicated beyond a reasonable doubt).
(with respect to Article 134,
UCMJ, given its
structure and elements, an accused must also know under what clause he
is
pleading guilty; this is accomplished either through advice by the
military
judge or through operation of the lesser included offense doctrine).
(in this case, appellant’s
guilty pleas to
clause 3 child pornography offenses under Article 134, UCMJ, were not
knowing
and voluntary to lesser offenses under clause 2 where appellant was not
advised
during the plea inquiry that in addition to pleading guilty to clause 3
offenses, he was by implication also pleading guilty to clause 2
offenses not
charged or otherwise included in the specifications as drafted;
although
appellant admitted to service discrediting conduct in the context of
pleading
guilty to violations of clause 3, he did so without knowledge that in
pleading
guilty to clause 3 offenses, he was not required to plead guilty to
service
discrediting conduct under clause 2; it bears emphasis that this is a
question
about the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea and not the adequacy
of the
factual basis supporting the plea).