2023 (October Term)
H.V.Z. v. United States and Fewell, 85 M.J. 8 (Article 6b, UCMJ, guarantees certain rights to victims of UCMJ offenses and establishes procedures for the vindication of those rights; when a victim believes that a military judge's ruling violates her Article 6b rights; Article 6b(e)(1), UCMJ, authorizes the victim to immediately petition the relevant CCA for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to comply with Article 6b, UCMJ; Article 6b, UCMJ, does not specify a victim petitioner's burden of proof when seeking a writ of mandamus from the CCA, but to prevail on a writ of mandamus, a petitioner generally must show that: (1) there is no other adequate means to attain relief; (2) the right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable; and (3) the issuance of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances).
(in Article 6b(e), UCMJ, Congress granted victims of UCMJ offenses the opportunity to petition the CCA for a writ of mandamus, but it did not dictate a burden of proof that those victims must establish to obtain a writ; in the absence of a legislative directive establishing otherwise, there is no basis for an appellate court to deviate from the ordinary burden imposed on writ petitioners, which it may be presumed that Congress understood and intended to have apply).
(a victim is required to establish a clear and indisputable right to a writ of mandamus).
(in this case, the military judge did not commit clear and indisputable error when he determined that the victim's health and mental health records were in the possession, custody, or control of military authorities for the purposes of RCM 701(a)(2)(A) allowing the defense to inspect any documents in the possession, custody, or control of military authorities; the medical treatment facility that held the records was located on a military base that served active duty military members, retirees, and their families, was commanded by a military officer, and its mission included military readiness; considering the deference afforded to the military judge in the procedural posture of this case, the plain meaning of military authorities can be construed to include this medical treatment facility).
(in this case, under MRE 513(e), the military judge was required to provide the victim with the opportunity to be heard on the production of her mental health records, and his conclusion that the victim lacked standing to oppose the production of her medical and mental health records amounted to clear and indisputable error).
B.M. v. United States, 84 M.J. 314 (under Article 6b(a), UCMJ, the victim of an alleged offense has a right to be treated with fairness and respect and a right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay; but these rights do not give the victim a judicially cognizable interest in the ultimate question of whether the government will or will not prosecute the accused; because the abatement order in this case that abated the proceedings was not a court-martial ruling that violated the rights of the victim afforded by Article 6b(a), UCMJ, the named victim therefore lacked standing to challenge the abatement order by an extraordinary writ before the CCA, and thus she lacked standing before the CAAF).
(in this case, the named victim's request to disqualify the military judge in her case is not ripe for decision in light of the fact that the military judge abated the proceedings).
(in this case, the named victim's request to have her medical records returned to a privileged and protected status is moot in light of the fact that the military judge sealed her records and any communications in the records that were privileged remain privileged).
2020 (October Term)
United States v. Tyler, 81 M.J. 108 (in 2013, Congress revised presentencing procedures by enacting Article 6b(a)(4)(B), UCMJ, 10 USC § 806b(a)(4)(B), to give a victim the right to be reasonably heard at a sentencing hearing concerning the offense of which he or she is the victim; the President promulgated RCM 1001A to facilitate the statutory right to be reasonably heard (now found in RCM 1001(c)); a victim may make a sworn or unsworn statement during sentencing in a noncapital case).
(if unsworn victim statements are part of the evidence of record, they can be commented on by counsel in presentencing argument).
(an unsworn victim statement, although not evidence, can nevertheless be commented on by either party in presentencing argument; and counsel’s comments concerning a victim’s unsworn statement may include both references and arguments).
2017 (October Term)
United States v. Barker, 77 M.J. 377 (Article 6b, UCMJ, outlines the rights of a victim within the military justice system, including the right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of a range of proceedings related to an accused; these rights include the reasonable right to confer with the counsel representing the Government in any such proceeding, Article 6b(a)(5), UCMJ, and the right to be reasonably heard in public hearings related to pretrial confinement, a sentencing hearing, the public proceeding of the service clemency, and a parole relating to the offense; provision is also made for the appointment of an individual to assume the Article 6b, UCMJ, rights of a victim who is under the age of eighteen, or “incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased).