

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE ARMED FORCES**

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**UNITED STATES,**  
*Appellee,*

v.

**ANTHONY A. ANDERSON,**  
Master Sergeant (E-7),  
United States Air Force,  
*Appellant.*

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USCA Dkt. No. 22-0193/AF

Crim. App. Dkt. No. 39969

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**AMICUS BRIEF ON BEHALF OF  
PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS  
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE**

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Peter Coote  
Pennoni Associates Inc.  
1900 Market Street, Third Floor  
Philadelphia, PA 19103  
(215) 254-7857  
pcoote@pennoni.com

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## **GRANTED ISSUE**

Whether Appellant was deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the Fifth Amendment's Right to Equal Protection.

## **ISSUE PRESENTED BY AMICUS**

Whether this Court has the jurisdiction or power to determine that a law violates the Constitution.

## **INTEREST OF AMICUS**

Amicus curiae Protect Our Defenders is dedicated to ending rape and sexual assault in the military. It honors, supports, and gives voice to survivors of military sexual assault and sexual harassment. Protect Our Defenders works for reform to ensure survivors and service members are provided a safe, respectful work environment and have access to a fair, impartially administered system of justice. Victims of military sexual assault will be affected if this Court declares Article 52 unconstitutional.

## **STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION**

As conceded by the parties, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case under 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) ("Article 67"). Although a court may have jurisdiction over a case, it may not necessarily have the power to decide all issues

or to grant all relief. In *Clinton v. Goldsmith*, 526 U.S. 529 (1999), the Supreme Court held that this Court did not have the power to review an executive action that was not a finding or sentence. The Court explained that it would be “an entirely different matter” if a military authority altered a judgment. *Id.* at 536. In *Goldsmith*, this Court had jurisdiction over the parties and the case but did not have jurisdiction over the specific issue decided.

This Court has a special obligation to satisfy itself that it has the jurisdiction and power to decide the granted issues. The granted issue is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. § 852 (“Article 52”). If it were to decide that Article 52 is unconstitutional, the Court would be usurping judicial power that is not granted to it by the Constitution.

### **SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

This Court is a tribunal constituted by Congress as an executive branch entity. It is not an Article III court. Although its constitutional foundation as a judicial body is firmly established, the Court does not have the judicial Power to rule that laws are unconstitutional. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial branch to say what the law is.

Military tribunals are without power to judge the constitutionality of validly enacted laws. Congress has the constitutional duty to regulate and govern the

armed forces, and the President is the commander in chief. While military tribunals are judicial in character, they cannot exercise the ultimate judicial power by striking down a statute. The Constitution reserves to courts established under Article III the judicial Power of reviewing the constitutionality of laws. Military courts' duty is to apply and interpret the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") and the rules and regulations issued thereunder.

Where the UCMJ is unambiguous, the sole function of this Court is to enforce it according to its terms. If it were to hold a UCMJ provision unconstitutional, the Court would be usurping the duty the Constitution gives to Congress. This Court may not interfere with the decision made by Congress to convict an accused by the concurrence of only three-fourths of the court-martial members.

This Court may act only with respect to matters of law. As used in Article 67(c)(4), "law" means the laws enacted by Congress and signed by the President. It does not include the power to strike a law down as unconstitutional.

## **ARGUMENT**

### **A. This Court Must Independently Determine Whether It Has Jurisdiction to Decide the Granted Issues.**

Although the parties concede jurisdiction, this Court must assure itself it has jurisdiction, including the power to determine the constitutionality of Article 52.

*Randolph v. H.V.*, 76 M.J. 27, 29 (C.A.A.F. 2017) quoting *Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.*, 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).

In *United States v. Matthews*, 16 M.J. 354 (C.A.A.F. 1983), this Court's predecessor decided it had the power to rule on constitutional issues, but it did not hold that it could judge a statute unconstitutional and refuse to enforce it.. *Id.* at 364-68. The continued viability of *Matthews* is questionable because of subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning differences between Article I tribunals and Article III courts. *Ortiz v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2018); and *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011). These cases and *Matthews* will be discussed below.

Amicus Protect Our Defenders presents a serious jurisdictional argument that deserves sustained consideration by this Court. *Ortiz*, 138 S. Ct. at 2173.

**B. Article 67(c)(4) Limits the Court's Jurisdiction to Matters of Law.**

This Court's jurisdiction is defined and limited by Article 67. Article 67(c)(4) confines this Court's power to acting only with respect to matters of law. *Clinton v. Goldsmith*, 526 U.S. 529, 534 (1999). This statutory jurisdiction is "narrowly circumscribed." *Id.* at 535; *Loving v. United States*, 63 M.J. 235, 239, 244 n.60 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (jurisdiction cannot be granted or assumed by implication, particularly in the case of an Article I court whose jurisdiction must be strictly construed); *Randolph v. H.V.* 76 M.J. 27, 32 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (Ryan, J.



concurring) (“Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”).

Article 67(c)(4) limits this Court to “tak[ing] action only with respect to the matters of law.” When analyzing Article 67(c)(4), the Court must construe “law” strictly and narrowly. If “law” were interpreted expansively, then orders, rules, regulations, statutes, and the Constitution could be within the reach of the grant, and the Court would have the power (to the extent constitutionally permissible) to decide constitutional issues. An expansive interpretation is not justified because jurisdiction cannot be granted by Congress or assumed by the Court by implication. *Loving*, 63 M.J. at 244 n.60. Jurisdiction must be expressly granted, and “matters of law” does not include “constitutional matters.”

The “natural referent” for the meaning of “law” within the UCMJ is the UCMJ itself. *Briggs v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 467, 470 (2020). Article 67 does not explicitly refer to the UCMJ, but instead uses the term “matter of law.” Although “matter of law” could be interpreted more expansively than “UCMJ,” it is not. “Matter of law,” like “punishable by death,” is a term of art that is limited to the laws within the UCMJ. *Briggs*, 141 S. Ct. at 473.

Where Congress intends to grant jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution, it does so explicitly. It has not granted such jurisdiction to this Court. *See, e.g.*, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Federal Question (“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of

all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).

Congress has explicitly granted other Article I courts the power to interpret the Constitution, but it has not given them the power to declare laws unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Claims Court”), an Article I court, is granted the power to “interpret constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions,” and may set aside decisions, findings, conclusions, rules, and regulations found to be “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.” 38 U.S.C. § 7261. This language gives the Veterans Claims Court has the power to interpret the Constitution, but it does not grant it the power to set aside a law as contrary to the Constitution. Review of the Veterans Claims Court’s decisions lies with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit Court”), an Article III court. 38 U.S.C. § 7292.

Unlike the language used in describing the Veterans Claims Court’s powers, Congress granted the Federal Circuit Court the “exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the **validity of any statute** or regulation or any interpretation thereof . . . , and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (emphasis added). When Congress intends to grant a court the power of judicial review, it does so. It did not do so in Article 67.

Nowhere in the text of the entire UCMJ is there any authority for this Court to judge another UCMJ provision unconstitutional. In fact, the UCMJ mentions “Constitution” only once, and that is to state that this Court is an Article I court. 10 U.S.C. § 941. When interpreting the UCMJ, this Court looks to the Manual for Courts-Martial (“MCM”), including its Preamble. *United States v. Wiesen*, 56 M.J. 172, 175-76 (C.A.A.F. 2001). The Preamble states:

“Military **law** consists of the **statutes** governing the military establishment and regulations issued thereunder, the **constitutional powers of the President** and regulations issued thereunder, and the inherent authority of military commanders.”

MCM, Preamble § 3, Nature and Purpose of Military Law (emphasis added).

Military “law” consists of the statutes but not the Constitution, except to the extent the Constitution grants the President powers.

“Law” in Article 67 limits this Court to interpreting and applying statutes. It may use the Constitution when interpreting a statute, but it may not declare any statute unconstitutional.

### **C. “Law” Must Be Interpreted So That Article 67 Is Constitutional.**

“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, . . . it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” *United States v. Ali*, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012), quoting *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 72

(1932); *see also Johnson v. Robison*, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974)<sup>1</sup> and *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 971 (2019).

“Law” is ambiguous because it does not expressly grant or deny this Court authority to review the constitutionality of laws. The Court must interpret Article 67’s “law” so that it will not violate the Constitution that vests “the judicial Power” of the United States in Article III Courts.

**D. Declaring Laws Unconstitutional Is the Ultimate Exercise of the Judicial Power.**

The Constitution assigns resolution of constitutional issues to the Judiciary. *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011). “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). If a law conflicts with the Constitution, then Article III courts must determine which governs the case. “This is of the *very essence of judicial duty*.” *Id.* at 178 (emphasis added).

Judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is the “gravest and most delicate duty” the Supreme Court is called on to perform. *Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder*, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009); *Rostker v. Goldberg*, 453

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<sup>1</sup> *Robison* is the mirror image of the issue argued in this brief. In *Robison*, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution required an ambiguous statute to be interpreted so that an Article III has court the power to review the constitutionality of statute that appeared to prohibit judicial review. Here, the Constitution requires Article 67 to be interpreted so that constitutional review of statutes by this Court is prohibited. *See also Traynor v. Turnage*, 485 U.S. 535 (1988).

U.S. 57, 64 (1981). Congress is a branch of government that is equal to [the Supreme] Court, and its elected members take the same oath to uphold the Constitution as the members of this Court. *Id.* The Supreme Court accords more than the customary deference accorded the judgments of Congress where the case arises in the context of national defense and military affairs. *Rostker*, 453 U.S. at 486.

A basic principle of our constitutional scheme is that “one branch of the Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another.” *Loving v. United States*, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996). Article III is “an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances” that “both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.” *Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.*, 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (plurality opinion). The judicial Power cannot be shared with another branch of the government. *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. at 483. “There is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.” *Id.* (quoting *The Federalist* No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).

As discussed in the next section, the judicial character of military tribunals gives them significant powers to adjudicate rights to life, liberty, and property. Nevertheless, Article III imposes limits that cannot be transgressed. *Stern*, 564 U.S. at 483. Article III cannot preserve the system of checks and balances or the

integrity of judicial decision making if entities outside of Article III exercised the judicial Power. *Id.* at 484.

**E. The Supreme Court’s Decision in *Ortiz* Does Not Support this Court’s Exercise of the Judicial Power of the United States.**

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Ortiz v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) does not support the this Court’s ability to strike down a statute as unconstitutional. In *Ortiz*, the Supreme Court confirmed this Court’s importance atop the court-martial system. *Id.* at 2171. More importantly, *Ortiz* holds that “the judicial character and constitutional pedigree of the court-martial system enable [the Supreme] Court, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, to review the decisions [of this Court].” *Id.* at 2173. The Supreme Court recognized that the military justice system’s essential character is judicial. *Id.* at 2174. Military courts “decide questions of the most momentous description, affecting even life itself.” *Id.* at 2175, (quoting Thomas, J. concurring, at 2186-87, quotation marks and ellipses omitted).

The Supreme Court in *Ortiz* unequivocally affirms that military courts are fundamentally judicial, and that the Supreme Court can, without violating the Constitution, exercise appellate review over this Court’s decisions. The decisions the Supreme Court reviews may come from Article III courts, but they need not. *Id.* at 2176.

*Ortiz* also affirms that Congress constituted this Court as an Article I court and located it within the executive branch rather than the judicial branch. *Id.* The Supreme Court in *Ortiz* never states or implies that military courts or any other Article I court may exercise “the judicial Power” vested in Article III courts. The Court is careful to say only that its appellate jurisdiction “rest[s] on the judicial character, as well as the constitutional foundations and history, of the court-martial system.” *Id.* at 2180. The Court repeatedly states that this Court has “judicial character” but never says the Court has “the judicial Power.” *Id.*

In concurrence, Justice Thomas distinguishes “the judicial Power” from “a judicial power,” explaining that appellate jurisdiction requires the exercise of a judicial power and not necessarily the judicial Power that Article III vests exclusively in federal courts. *Id.* at 2185 (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas explains that this Court exercises a judicial power capable of adjudicating core private rights to life, liberty, and property, but he reiterates that only federal courts established under Article III may exercise the judicial Power of the United States. *Id.* at 2186.

Declaring a law unconstitutional is the ultimate judicial Power.

#### **F. Article III Courts Have Expertise in Constitutional Law.**

The “experts” in constitutional law are the Article III courts. Judging the constitutionality of congressional acts is the prototypical exercise of the judicial

Power, and if this right is given to military tribunals then “Article III would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of powers [this Court] has long recognized into mere wishful thinking.” *Stern*, 564 U.S. at 495.

Although military tribunals have developed expertise in military law, they do not have expertise in constitutional law. *O'Callahan v. Parker*, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969), *overruled on other grounds by Solorio v. United States*, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (“courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law”).

The Supreme Court reversed every case it reviewed where this Court decided a statute or rule was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed every case it reviewed where the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute or rule.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The Supreme Court has reviewed eleven cases decided by this Court since it was granted jurisdiction to directly review this Court’s decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1259. The Supreme Court has affirmed this Court’s decisions in every case where a convicted service member’s petition for certiorari was granted. *Ortiz v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018); *Edmond v. United States*, 520 U. S. 651 (1997); *Loving v. United States*, 517 U. S. 748 (1996); *Ryder v. United States*, 515 U. S. 177 (1995); *Davis v. United States*, 512 U. S. 452 (1994); *Weiss v. United States*, 510 U. S. 163 (1994); *Solorio v. United States*, 483 U. S. 435 (1987). The Supreme Court also affirmed where this Court did not overrule any statute, but merely interpreted statutory provisions. *United States v. Denedo*, 556 U.S. 904 (2009).

In the remaining three cases, this Court determined that a statute or rule was unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court reversed each on the merits of the constitutional question presented in each case. *United States v. Briggs*, 141 S. Ct. 467 (2020); *Clinton v. Goldsmith*, 526 U. S. 529 (1999); *United States v. Scheffer*, 523 U. S. 303 (1998).



To be clear, the Amicus Curiae Protect Our Defenders does not suggest that this Court and other Article I tribunals must or should ignore the Constitution. When interpreting statutes and rules, tribunals should interpret any ambiguity or gap in accordance with the Constitution. Where there is no ambiguity, this Court and other tribunals must apply the laws or rules as written and are forbidden from overruling Congress.

“[I]f there is a principle in our Constitution . . . more sacred than another,’ James Madison said on the floor of the First Congress, ‘it is that which separates the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers.’” *Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. V. Sharif*, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 581 (1789)).

**G. *Matthews* Does Not Allow Striking Down a Statute.**

*Matthews* did not facially invalidate or overrule any statute. It only interpreted the capital punishment provisions of 10 U.S.C. §§ 918 and 920 (“Article 118” (murder) and “Article 120” (rape)), and held that these Articles required the same capital punishment standards that are applied by the Supreme Court in civilian cases.<sup>3</sup> Although this Court upheld the constitutionality of the

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<sup>3</sup> This interpretation was later questioned (but not decided) by the Supreme Court in *Loving v. United States*, 517 U.S. 748, 755 (1996). The Supreme Court declined to address whether its civilian death penalty jurisprudence applied to courts-martial because the government did not contest the issue. When deciding *Loving*, the Supreme Court assumed its civilian standards applied to the military. *Id.*

death penalty provisions of these Articles, the Court determined the rules and regulations did not comply with the Articles as interpreted.<sup>4</sup>

Although the CMA in *Matthews* did not hold any statute unconstitutional, in dictum it stated that if it did not have “unfettered power to decide constitutional issues,” a constitutional question would arise whether an Article I judge could be “required by oath to support the Constitution . . . , but at the same time be forced to make decisions and render judgments based on statutes which he concluded were contrary to the Constitution.” *Matthews*, 16 M.J. at 366. This statement implies that judges, members of Congress, officers of the executive branch, and citizens of the United States are free to act on their conclusions as to the constitutionality of any law or the Constitution itself. The Constitution assigns to Article I the

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The *Matthews* decision was final and could not be reviewed because the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to directly review CMA decisions. *Matthews*, at 368.

<sup>4</sup> Amicus has not found any Article III court case law squarely addressing whether an Article I court can strike down as statute. No military court has squarely addressed this issue. The only opinions by military judges that have addressed Article I courts review of constitutional issues are *Matthews* and *United States v. Jacoby*, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960) (Latimer, J. dissenting). *Matthews* used the Constitution to interpret the UCMJ, and cited *Jacoby* for the proposition that the CMA would have to consider constitutional issues since a statute must be interpreted in a manner to avoid constitutional defects. *Matthews*, 16 M.J. at 368. The *Jacoby* majority decided the statute at issue was constitutional and did not address whether the CMA had the power to declare a statute unconstitutional. In dissent, Judge Latimer scolded the CMA for assuming without demonstrating that the court possessed such power. *Jacoby*, 29 C.M.R. at 249-50. Judge Latimer did not believe the CMA should have reached the merits.

obligation to make laws, to Article II the duty to execute laws, and to Article III the power to determine the law. By the *Matthews*' court's reasoning, this Court would be free to ignore the Supreme Court if its judges concluded the Supreme Court's determinations were contrary to the Constitution.

Before and since *Matthews*, the Supreme Court repeatedly observed that the Constitution assigns to Congress the delicate task of balancing the rights of service members against the needs of the military. *Burns v. Wilson*, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (the Constitution entrusts Congress with the task of defining service members rights and providing a complete system of review to secure those rights); *Solorio v. United States*, 483 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1987); *Weiss v United States*, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994); *Loving v. United States*, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996).

As this Court has recognized, even Article III courts will not interfere with the other branches of government when they are exercising the powers assigned to them by the Constitution. *United States v. New*, 55 M.J. 95, 109 (C.A.A.F. 2001). When the President acts pursuant to the express authorization of Congress his authority is at its maximum, and he is said to "personify the federal sovereignty." *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952). The President acting pursuant to an act of Congress is "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation." *Id.* at 637. When

Article I acts in solidarity with Article II pursuant to powers and duties assigned to them by the Constitution, Article III does not interfere.

While the CMA in *Matthews* held that it had the power to decide constitutional issues, the constitutional issues it decided merely aided the court in interpreting the statutes. In this case, the Appellant is not asking this Court to interpret an ambiguous Article 52, but he is asking this Court to declare that Article 52 is unconstitutional, ignoring the strongest presumption favoring constitutionality even though the Supreme Court has not held Article 52 unconstitutional. “[W]hen the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.” *E.V. v. United States*, 75 M.J. 331, 333 (C.A.A.F. 2016); quoting *Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.*, 530 U.S. 1 (2000).

If Article 52 violates the Constitution, only an Article III court can make that determination. This Court should not boldly perform the delicate task assigned to the Supreme Court.

#### **H. The Cases Cited by Appellant Do Not Invalidate Any Law.**

In his brief, the Appellant cites numerous military justice cases to demonstrate that service members have the same constitutional rights as civilians. *Id.* at 9. Each of the cases cited by the Appellant rely upon the Constitution to interpret and fill voids left by the UCMJ. *United States v. Hershey*, 20 M.J. 433,

435 (CMA 1985) (public trial) (Appellant’s Brief at 30); *United States v. Girouard*, 70 M.J. 5, 10 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation) (Appellant’s Brief at 30-31); *United States v. Blazier*, 69 M.J. 218, 222 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (confrontation) (Appellant’s Brief at 30); *United States v. Bess*, 75 M.J. 70, 75 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (compulsory service) (Appellant’s Brief at 31); *United States v. Wattenbarger*, 21 M.J. 41, 43 (CMA 1985) (counsel) (Appellant’s Brief at 31); *United States v. Lambert*, 55 M.J. 293, 294 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (impartial panel) (Appellant’s Brief at 14, 29-30); *United States v. Wiesen*, 56 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (impartial panel) (Appellant’s Brief at 31-32); and *United States v. Richardson*, 61 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (Appellant’s Brief at 32).

This Court did not declare any law unconstitutional in any of the cases cited by the Appellant. In each case the Court applies the Constitution to the UCMJ and the Rules for Courts-Martial (“R.C.M.”) to assist in interpretation. For example, in *Weisen*, 56 M.J. at 174 the appellant alleged that the military judge violated his constitutional rights because he failed to remove a potential member for cause in violation of R.C.M. 912. The constitutional right to an impartial jury is supported by the UCMJ and R.C.M., and the *Wiesen* Court simply interpreted the law and rules in light of the Constitution. No military justice case cited by the Appellant overrules as unconstitutional any law.

Declaring a law to be unconstitutional is extraordinary, and the Appellant did not cite a single case where this Court has declared a law to be facially unconstitutional. In the cases where this Court has declared a law unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has reversed. See n.2 above. This Court should not declare Article 52 unconstitutional.

**I. Appellant Has Multiple Alternative Means to Obtain Constitutional Review of Article 52 in an Article III Court.**

The Appellant may petition the Supreme Court for certiorari after this Court's decision. 10 U.S.C. § 867a; and 28 U.S.C. § 1259. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of Article 52.

Second, the Appellant may seek collateral review of the constitutionality of Article 52 in federal district court. *Larrabee v. Braithwaite*, 502 F.Supp. 3d 322 (D.D.C. 2020) reversed by *Larrabee v. Toro*, 45 F.4th 81 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

*Larrabee* demonstrates that the Appellant has constitutionally valid means to obtain Article III review of Article 52's constitutionality. *Chappell v. Wallace*, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (although military tribunals cannot provide relief, service members may seek redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service).

## CONCLUSION

Chief Judge Stucky, quoting Chief Justice Chase, observed:

“[J]udicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and the laws confer.”

*E.V.*, 75 M.J. at 334; quoting *Ex parte McCardle*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).

WHEREFORE, Amicus Curiae Protect Our Defenders respectfully requests this Court to decline ungranted jurisdiction and to affirm the decision of the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,



Peter Coote, Esq.  
*Attorney for Amicus Curiae*  
*Protect Our Defenders*  
Court Bar No. 35957

Pennoni Associates Inc.  
1900 Market Street, Suite 300  
Philadelphia, PA 19104

[pcoote@pennoni.com](mailto:pcoote@pennoni.com)

Phone: (215) 254-7857

## CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

I certify that on October 3, 2022, a copy of the foregoing was transmitted by electronic means to the following:

- (1) This Court: [efiling@armfor.uscourts.gov](mailto:efiling@armfor.uscourts.gov)
- (2) Counsel for Appellant: William E. Cassara, Esq.
- (3) Counsel for Appellee: Mary Ellen Payne, Esq.

## CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULES

I certify that this brief complies with the maximum length authorized by Rule 26(d) because this brief contains is 4,427 words. This brief complies with the typeface and type style requirements of Rule 37 because it was prepared using Microsoft Word with Times New Roman 14-point font, a monospaced font.

Respectfully submitted,



Peter Coote, Esq.  
*Attorney for Amicus Curiae*  
*Protect Our Defenders*  
Court Bar No. 35957

Pennoni Associates Inc.  
1900 Market Street, Suite 300  
Philadelphia, PA 19104

[pcoote@pennoni.com](mailto:pcoote@pennoni.com)  
Phone: (215) 254-7857