2022 (October Term)
United States v. Harrington, 83 M.J. 408 (credibility determinations are uniquely the province of the trier of fact, and an appellate court will not disturb an appellant’s conviction on this ground).
2018 (October Term)
United States v. Frost, 79 M.J. 104 (statements made after an improper influence arose do not rehabilitate a witness’s credibility).
2015 (September Term)
United States v. Martin, 75 M.J. 321 (if a witness does not expressly state that he believes a person is truthful, a court examines the testimony to determine if it is the functional equivalent of human lie detector testimony; testimony is the functional equivalent of human lie detector testimony when it invades the unique province of the court members to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the substance of the testimony leads the members to infer that the witness believes the victim is truthful or deceitful with respect to an issue at trial).
(human lie detector evidence is inadmissible at a court-martial because it is a fundamental premise of our criminal trial system that the panel is the lie detector and determines the weight and credibility of witness testimony).
2014 (September Term)
United States v. Piren, 74 M.J. 24 (an accused who exercises his right to testify takes his credibility with him to the stand, and it may be assailed by every proper means; this is reflected in MRE 611(b), which allows cross-examination into the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness).
(when an accused takes the stand, the privilege against self-incrimination is waived; an accused is not required to testify in his defense and his failure to do so may not be the basis for any inference against him; but where he does elect to testify, his credibility may be impeached like that of other witnesses; hence, though he may not be cross-examined as to his general character, he may be so examined as to his credibility).
(MRE 611(b) authorizes cross-examination into matters affecting the credibility of the witness; when appellant elected to testify, he placed his credibility at issue and the government’s cross-examination as to the statements he had made to a sexual assault nurse examiner was designed to explore that credibility; as such, the government could properly test appellant’s credibility on cross-examination; when appellant then testified on cross-examination as to what he had told the nurse during the sexual assault examination, his credibility remained at issue, and his testimony was opened to impeachment by contradiction by having the nurse testify to the contrary; although appellant’s statements were unwarned, MRE 304(b)(1) [now MRE 304(e)(1)] specifically provides for the use of unwarned statements for purposes of impeachment by contradiction; therefore, the military judge did not abuse her discretion in overruling the defense objection that the government’s cross-examination exceeded the scope of direct examination and by subsequently allowing impeachment by contradiction).
2013 (September Term)
United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33 (it is the exclusive province of the court members to determine the credibility of witnesses).
(where an AFSOI agent testified that, using his specialized training, he was able to determine from specific nonverbal clues that appellant was being deceptive when he provided an innocent account of the events in question, this testimony was impermissible human lie detector testimony and improperly usurped the members’ role in determining witness credibility).
2010 (September Term)United States v. Sullivan, 70 M.J. 110 (the Confrontation Clause preserves the right of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him; this right includes the right to cross-examine witnesses, including on issues of bias and credibility).
(the rules of evidence should be read to allow liberal admission of bias-type evidence).
(an accused does not have a right to cross-examine a witness on any subject solely because he describes it as one of credibility, truthfulness, or bias; there must be a direct nexus to the case that is rooted in the record; that is, the evidence must be logically relevant as required by MRE 401, and it must also be legally relevant in accordance with the MRE 403 balancing test; in short, the right to cross-examine is the right to question where the proffer establishes a real and direct nexus to a fact or issue at hand).
United States v. Savala, 70 M.J. 70 (the CCA did not clearly err in concluding that the prosecution opened the door to cross-examination of the victim with respect to a prior complaint of sexual assault that the defense contended was fabricated to protect her reputation, where the prosecution introduced evidence of the victim’s prior complaint to bolster her credibility with respect to the reasons for her delayed reporting of the charged offense, thereby benefiting the prosecution).
(issues of witness credibility and motive are matters for the members to decide).
2009 (September Term)
United
States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (in a trial
involving the sexual assault of a
child, an expert may testify as to what symptoms are found among
children who
have suffered sexual abuse and whether the child-witness has exhibited
these
symptoms; however, an expert may not testify regarding the credibility
or
believability of a victim, or opine as to the guilt or innocence of an
accused).
(it was error to admit expert
testimony from
which the court members could infer that there was a 1 in 200 chance
that the
allegations of child victims of sexual assault were false; such an
inference
derived from expert testimony invades the province of the members to
determine
the credibility of witnesses; an expert inference that there was a 1 in
200
chance the victim is lying undermines the duty of the panel members to
determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (credibility
quantification testimony implicates the very concerns underlying the
prohibition against human lie detector testimony; it invades the
province of the court members to determine the credibility of the
victim and violates the limitations of MRE 608 on admissible testimony
relating to truthfulness).
United States v. Dobson, 63 M.J. 1 (the military judge
erred when he prevented appellant from introducing corroborating
evidence when her credibility was attacked; such evidence is admissible
to rebut a claim of recent fabrication under MRE 801(d)(1)(B)).
United
States v. Saferite, 59 MJ 270 (during sentencing, as
at every
other moment of trial testimony, the credibility of a witness is an
omnipresent
issue; each witness’s credibility determines the authority of the
testimony;
Section VI of the Military Rules of Evidence is entitled “Witnesses,”
but
easily could be viewed as “Credibility of Witnesses” as the whole
section
focuses on technical evidentiary rules to bolster or to attack the
credibility
of testimony).
(MRE
608 is a
key evidentiary rule that covers several methods to bolster or attack
the
credibility of a witness; these methods include opinion and reputation
evidence
as to the character of a witness for truthfulness and questions
regarding
specific instances of conduct that may be relevant to credibility).
2001
United
States v. Goldwire, 55 MJ 139 (it is not
reasonable to
conclude that attacks on the credibility of a speaker’s statement are
excluded
merely because the statement is admitted as made by a party-opponent;
when the
defense affirmatively introduces the accused’s statement in response to
the
prosecution’s direct examination initially admitting some portion of
the
statement, the prosecution is not prohibited from impeaching the
declarant
under Mil. R. Evid. 806).
United
States v. Hart, 55 MJ 395 (Mil. R. Evid. 806
permits
attacks upon the credibility of a hearsay declarant as well as attacks
upon the
declarant of a statement which is not hearsay under Mil. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(C),
(D), or (E)).
(where pretrial statements made by appellant are elicited during
cross-examination as “state of mind” evidence, appellant is then
treated as a
declarant/testifying witness and the government may properly introduce
reputation and opinion evidence to impeach appellant’s truthfulness
pursuant to
Mil. R. Evid. 806).
(once defense counsel’s cross-examination introduced appellant’s
exculpatory
pretrial statements, it was appropriate to introduce character evidence
as to
appellant’s untruthfulness).
United
States v. Whitney, 55 MJ 413 (human lie detector
testimony
is inadmissible).
2000
United
States v. Jenkins, 54 MJ 12 (MRE 608(a) permits
the
credibility of a witness to be supported or attacked by opinion
evidence, but
that opinion evidence may refer only to the witness’ character for
truthfulness
or untruthfulness; a witness may not, however, opine that another
witness is
lying or telling the truth).
(it is improper for a trial counsel to compel a defendant to state
that the
witnesses testifying against him are lying).
(while
it is improper
for a
trial counsel to compel a defendant to state that the witnesses
testifying
against him are lying, each such case will be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis
to determine if the improper cross-examination was prejudicial).
(trial counsel’s improper questioning, which was designed to compel
the
accused to state that the witnesses testifying against him were lying,
was not
plain error where: (1) defense counsel’s theme of the case was
that the
accused had been framed by his co-actors; (2) accused declined to
respond to
trial counsel’s questions about whether certain witnesses were lying;
and (3)
even though the accused did testify that a law enforcement officer was
testifying falsely, that error was harmless where trial counsel’s
questions
merely reinforced the defense theory of the case).