IN THE
CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Deandrea J. KING Jr., Airman Basic
No. 05-0044
Crim. App. No. 35653
Argued
Decided
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GIERKE, C.J., CRAWFORD, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain John N. Page III (argued); Colonel Carlos L. McDade, Major Terry L. McElyea, Major Sandra K. Whittington, and Captain Jennifer K. Martwick (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Stacey J. Vetter (argued); Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Combs and Lieutenant Colonel Gary F. Spencer (on brief).
Military Judge: Gregory E. Pavlik
This opinion is subject to
revision before final publication.
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Airman
Basic Deandrea J. King Jr. pleaded guilty to attempting to possess
cocaine and
ecstasy and to breaking restriction in violation of Articles 80 and
134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 934 (2000). A military judge sitting as a general
court-martial sentenced King to a bad-conduct discharge and nine months
of
confinement. The convening authority
approved the sentence and the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals
affirmed the findings and sentence.
Article 13, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 813
(2000), provides:
No person, while being held for trial, may be subjected to punishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon the charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the circumstances required to insure his presence, but he may be subjected to minor punishment during that period for infractions of discipline.
King, who was held in pretrial confinement at the hands of military authorities from March 9, 2003 until he was tried on June 26 and 27, 2003, argues that his custody status as a “maximum security” prisoner and the conditions of his confinement constituted illegal pretrial punishment and he should have been awarded credit for a violation of Article 13, UCMJ. We granted review to determine whether the military judge erred in denying King credit for pretrial punishment.1 We agree in part with King that he is entitled to confinement credit for a violation of Article 13, UCMJ.
FACTS
King,
who was pending administrative discharge from the Air Force, and a companion went for a night on the town despite
the fact that
King was on restriction as the result of nonjudicial punishment. During the evening King purchased what he
thought were cocaine and ecstasy from an undercover agent.
King was initially detained by civilian
authorities from February 7 to
After an initial evaluation, confinement officials classified King as a “maximum security” prisoner. He was confined in a double occupancy cell with another maximum custody pretrial inmate. The general conditions and restrictions imposed upon King as a maximum custody inmate included:
1. Remaining in the cell with the exception of appointments or emergencies;
2. Eating all meals in the cell (meals were delivered to the cell);
3. No library or gym privileges (books and gym equipment were delivered to the cell);
4. No sleeping during duty hours;
5. A requirement to wear a yellow jumpsuit and shackles when released for appointments; and
6. Two escorts, one of whom was armed, whenever King was moved to appointments.
King was permitted to watch a television that was placed outside the cell but close enough for him to reach out and change the channels. When he was moved outside the confinement facility, it was usually early in the morning and through alternate entrances to minimize public contact.
When
the inmate with whom King shared the cell was convicted at
court-martial,
confinement officials requested a waiver of the rules against
commingling
pretrial and post-trial prisoners. This
request was based on the limited confinement facilities at Barksdale
AFB. When that request was denied, King
was moved
on
During
King’s pretrial confinement, his defense counsel requested that King be
released from pretrial confinement or that his custody status be
“downgraded.” In response, defense counsel
received a memo
from King’s commander on
At trial, defense counsel made a motion for appropriate relief asserting that the conditions of King’s pretrial confinement amounted to punishment under Article 13. After receiving evidence and hearing argument on the motion, the military judge denied relief, finding that “[t]he conditions were based on legitimate non-punitive reasons. The conditions of [King’s] confinement were not more rigorous than necessary.”
DISCUSSION
King argues that his classification as a maximum custody inmate was more rigorous than required to ensure his presence for trial and to satisfy the Government’s concerns for safety in the confinement facility. He claims that not only was he incorrectly classified when he entered pretrial confinement but also that his continued classification as a maximum security inmate constituted punishment. Further, King asserts he was unlawfully punished by being commingled with a sentenced prisoner and later when he had to endure two weeks of solitary confinement after the request for a waiver of the prohibition against commingling pre- and post-trial prisoners was denied.
The Government counters that there was no intent to punish King and no conditions of his pretrial confinement were more rigorous than required by the circumstances. The Government argues that King’s history and the potential charges against him, as well as the responsibilities of confinement facility officials, support the finding of no punitive intent and do not support any inference of punishment. The Government asserts that commingling is not a per se violation of Article 13 and that King’s segregation was a nonpunitive act by a relatively small confinement facility confronted with limited space and options.
Our
determination of whether King endured
unlawful pretrial punishment involves both constitutional and statutory
considerations. See
Article
13, UCMJ, prohibits two
things: (1) the imposition of punishment
prior to trial, and (2) conditions of arrest or pretrial confinement
that are
more rigorous than necessary to ensure the accused’s presence for trial. The first prohibition of Article 13 involves
a purpose or intent to punish, determined by examining the intent of
detention
officials or by examining the purposes served by the restriction or
condition,
and whether such purposes are “reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental
objective.”
The
second prohibition of Article 13
prevents imposing unduly rigorous circumstances during pretrial
detention. Conditions that are
sufficiently egregious may
give rise to a permissive inference that an accused is being punished,
or the
conditions may be so excessive as to constitute punishment. McCarthy, 47 M.J.
at
165; United States v. James, 28 M.J. 214, 216 (C.M.A. 1989)
(conditions
that are “arbitrary or purposeless” can be considered to raise an
inference of
punishment).
The
military judge made no specific finding
of fact that the confinement facility officials had any intent to
punish King. Rather, the military judge
found that “the
conditions were based on legitimate non-punitive reasons.”
Similarly, the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals found neither punishment nor unduly rigorous conditions.
We
have reviewed the findings of the
military judge and the circumstances and conditions of King’s pretrial
confinement, including King’s status as a “maximum” custody inmate. We are reluctant to second-guess the security
determinations of confinement officials.
McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 167-68. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
determining what offenses to bring to trial does not necessarily alter
the
security concerns of confinement facility officials.
Thus, we do not find that King’s continued classification
as “maximum” custody was so egregious as to give rise to any inference
of
intent to punish. Nor do we find the
conditions of King’s confinement that resulted from his classification
to be so
excessive as to amount to punishment.
Similarly,
we do not find that any
departure from the guidelines for evaluation or reevaluation of custody
level was
indicative of punishment in this instance.
Table A3.1 of Air Force Instruction 31-205 (Apr. 2004), provides
discretionary authority to increase or decrease a custody level based
upon an
inmate’s behavior. Despite King’s
apparent good behavior in confinement, any alleged departure from the
directive’s authority to reclassify “does not justify the conclusion
that
confinement was a form of punishment or penalty . . . . [and]
does not, per se, require awarding additional credit.
McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 166, (citing United
States v. Moore, 32 M.J. 56, 60 (C.M.A. 1991)).
The
fact that defense counsel requested that King be released from pretrial
confinement or that his custody status be downgraded is not pivotal. Although the lack of complaint is some
evidence that an accused is not being punished in violation of Article
13, the
fact that a complaint is made does not necessarily demonstrate
punishment or
penalty. McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 166. Prisoners
can be very vocal about their conditions without those complaints
actually
reflecting any unlawful pretrial punishment.
Additionally,
the fact that King was
commingled with a post-trial inmate while a request for waiver was
processed
does not entitle King to credit.
Commingling with post-trial inmates is a factor to consider when
assessing conditions of confinement, but alone it is not a per se
violation of
Article 13.
However,
we find that King was subjected to
punishment during the two weeks he was in segregation following the
denial of
the confinement official’s request for a waiver from the prohibition
against commingling. The Government has
proffered no explanation
as to whether they explored alternatives and no sound reason why King,
a
pretrial inmate, was singled out and suffered segregation in a
six-by-six,
windowless cell. Other than a single
reprimand for falling asleep in his chair, the military judge found
that King was
not disciplined, caused no disturbances, made no threats, and was not
disrespectful during his pretrial confinement.
The decision to confine King in a segregated environment
otherwise
reserved for inmates with disciplinary problems was an arbitrary
response to
the physical limitations at Barksdale AFB.
We have previously referred to this type of result:
Given the limited facilities and programs
available at most installations, the total separation of pretrial
confinees
from the general population of the confinement facilities might well
result in
imposition of much harsher conditions than those imposed upon some
prisoners
who have been sentenced to hard labor.
We cannot believe that such an illogical and anomalous result is
necessary or was intended by Congress.
Palmiter,
20 M.J. at 94. Placing
King in a segregated environment with all the attributes of severe
restraint
and discipline, without an individualized demonstration of cause in the
record,
was so excessive as to be punishment and is not justified by the
Barksdale AFB
confinement facility space limitations. See
McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 165; James,
28 M.J.
at 216.
King
is entitled to appropriate
credit. See R.C.M. 305(k). We agree with King that an appropriate credit
in this instance is three days of administrative credit for each day he
endured
solitary segregation. We shall order the
appropriate credit.
DECISION
The
decision of the United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed except to the extent that it
holds that
King is not entitled to additional sentence credit for a violation of
Article
13, UCMJ. In addition to any other
confinement credits to which he is entitled, King will be credited with
service
of forty-two days of confinement.
1
We
granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT CREDIT UNDER ARTICLE 13, UCMJ.