UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Michael S. Farley, Sergeant
No. 03-0646
Crim. App. No. 20001079
Argued
Decided
CRAWFORD,
J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which GIERKE, C.J., EFFRON,
BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Eric D. Noble (argued); Colonel Mark Cremin, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci,and Captain Rob W. MacDonald (on brief); Colonel Robert D. Teetsel, Major Allyson G. Lambert, and Captain Gregory M. Kelch.
For Appellee: Captain Mason S. Weiss (argued); Colonel Steven T. Salata and Lieutenant Colonel Theresa A. Gallagher (on brief).
Military Judge: Robert F. Holland
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO
EDITORIAL
CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
Judge CRAWFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to
his pleas at trial by military judge, Appellant was convicted of rape
of a
child under the age of twelve, sodomy with a child under the age of
twelve, and
indecent acts with a child under the age of sixteen in violation of
Articles
120, 125, and 134, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 925, and 934 (2000). Appellant was sentenced to a
dishonorable discharge, twenty-three years of confinement, total
forfeiture of
pay and allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority waived the
forfeitures and reduced the term of confinement to nineteen years. The United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals
affirmed the findings and sentence. On
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S DECISION TO PLEAD GUILTY AT TRIAL WAIVED HIS FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS RETROACTIVELY WITH RESPECT TO INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED WHILE IN PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT AND LATER USED DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF HIS TRIAL.
We need not decide whether there was error, because any error was harmless.
On
[Appellant] said something to the effect that he needed to touch -– he had just got [sic] out of the field. His relationship with his wife was bad and his daughter [HF] was there, so he did it. And he said that if his mother was there he would did it [sic] to her also . . . I am thinking he was referencing having sex.
(emphasis added).
Ms.
Martin
testified at Appellant’s
Before receiving Appellant’s pleas, the military judge advised him that “any motion to dismiss any charge or to grant other relief shall be made at this time.” Defense counsel responded that Appellant had an unlawful command influence (UCI) motion, and added that “depending on who the government calls as witnesses, we may have some brief motions to suppress statements made by the accused.” When asked if they were ready to proceed, both defense counsel responded affirmatively, “[o]ther than with regard to [a] possible request to have a slight delay to meet the alleged government sentencing witness[.]” The military judge then asked Appellant to enter his plea “[w]ithout prejudice to the defense to resolve this UCI motion later[.]” Defense counsel did not move at this time to suppress Appellant’s pretrial statements to Ms. Martin.
During the providence inquiry, the military judge informed Appellant that by pleading guilty he waived his right against self-incrimination (i.e., “the right to say nothing at all”); his right to a trial of the facts by a court-martial (i.e., “the right to have the court determine whether or not you are guilty based on the evidence presented by the prosecution and on any evidence that you may present”); and “the right to confront and cross-examine any or all of the witnesses against you.” Appellant persisted in pleading guilty and agreed to the waiver outlined above. Appellant’s guilty pleas were not conditional, and the pretrial agreement contained no terms limiting his right to submit motions or enter objections.
According
to the
record, after Appellant pleaded guilty but before Ms. Martin testified,
the defense
moved to suppress her testimony:
CDC: [B]efore
we call
her . . . I still have to talk with co-counsel to make sure, we have a
motion
to suppress statements made to [Ms. Martin].
MJ: [W]hy is
defense
counsel at this point on a day of trial still figuring out whether or
not to
make a motion. I don’t understand that.
. . . .
CDC: The
witness
list that we received on Friday had a, I think, Sam Warren on it and we
were
not notified until just recently that it was going to be Miss Martin
instead. And there were statements made
to her that we believe are suppressible. . . .
After
Ms. Martin
testified, defense counsel moved to strike her testimony as violative
of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The
military judge ruled that the motion was untimely because it was made
after
Appellant’s plea of guilty, however, he
also reminded
Appellant it was not too late for Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. Furthermore, the military judge noted that,
if Appellant withdrew his guilty plea, he would be allowed to resubmit
the motion
to suppress Ms. Martin’s testimony. During
the aggravation portion of the presentencing hearing, the military
judge
admitted Appellant’s statement that he “needed a touch.”
DISCUSSION
The parties dispute the application of M.R.E. 304(d)(2)(A) and 304(d)(5).
M.R.E. 304(d)(2)(A) provides:
Motions to
suppress or objections under
this rule or [M.R.E. 302 or 305] to statements that have been disclosed
shall
be made by the defense prior to submission of a plea.
In the absence of such motion or objection,
the defense may not raise the issue at a later time except as permitted
by the
military judge for good cause shown.
Failure to so move or object constitutes a waiver of the
objection.
M.R.E. 304(d)(5) provides:
Except as
otherwise expressly provided
in R.C.M. 910(a)(2), a plea of guilty to an offense that results in a
finding
of guilty waives all privileges against self-incrimination and all
motions and
objections under this rule with respect to that offense regardless of
whether
raised prior to plea.
Even
if the
military judge did err in applying these two rules, we hold that error
was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
When the social worker interviewed Appellant in jail, Appellant said that he had just returned from a field exercise and needed to engage in some kind of sex. He described this as “need[ing] a touch.” This “touch” could have been from his wife or his mother, if she had been there, Appellant said. When asked about Appellant’s expressed desire to touch his mother, the social worker could not remember the circumstances or what Appellant meant. Nor did she follow up as to the meaning of his statement.
The stipulation of fact and a videotape of the victim’s statement to an investigator set forth in detail the numerous instances of rape, sodomy, and indecent acts with HF over an extensive period of time. Given the overwhelming nature of this evidence, if there was any error in this case, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
1
384
2 M.R.E. 304(d)(1) states: “Prior to arraignment, the prosecution shall disclose to the defense the contents of all statements, oral or written, made by the accused that are relevant to the case, known to trial counsel, and within the control of the armed forces.”
3 The disclosure
statement from the Government said:
The Accused made statements to the following individuals: On or about 16 May 00, the Accused stated to
CPS Case Worker Sam Warren, “I just needed the touch the other day. If my mother were there, I
would have had sex with her as well,” or words to that effect.