2010 (September Term)
United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (although Congress delegated to the President certain rulemaking authority under Article 36, UCMJ, not everything in the MCM represents an exercise of that authority, and the President does not have the authority to decide questions of substantive criminal law).
(some of the MCM is merely explanatory or hortatory; the sample specifications and drafters’ analysis are included among these categories and do not purport to be binding).
United
States v. Alston, 69 M.J. 214 (the MCM
expressly notes that its listing of
lesser included offenses is not all-inclusive).
United
States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138 (the President
has well-established authority
within the military justice system to clarify or give meaning to the
UCMJ
through promulgation of the Discussion and Analysis sections of the
MCM; the
President’s analysis of the punitive articles is persuasive, but not
binding,
authority; moreover, where the President’s narrowing construction is
favorable
to an accused and is not inconsistent with the language of a statute,
the
President’s narrowing construction, which is an appropriate Executive
branch
limitation on the conduct subject to prosecution, will not be disturbed
on
appeal).
United
States v. Matthews, 68 M.J. 29 (it is a well
established rule that principles
of statutory construction are used in construing the Military Rules of
Evidence; when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of
the courts
- at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd -
is to
enforce it according to its terms; in construing the language of a
statute or
rule, it is generally understood that the words should be given their
common
and approved usage).
United
States v. Custis, 65 M.J. 366 (it is a well
established rule that principles
of statutory construction are used in construing the MCM in general and
the MREs
in particular; when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function
of the
courts -- at least where the disposition required by the text is not
absurd --
is to enforce it according to its terms).
2007
United
States v. Taylor, 64 M.J. 416 (in construing the
language of a rule, it is generally understood that the words should be
given their common and approved usage).
2002
United
States v. Czeschin, 56 MJ 346 (the President’s
interpretations of substantive offenses in Part IV of the Manual are
not
binding on the judiciary, which has the responsibility to interpret
substantive
offenses under the Code; however, the President may issue rules in Part
IV and
has the authority to grant greater rights under Part IV than might be
provided
by statute).
2000
United
States v. Tualla, 52 MJ 228 (for purposes of
interpreting the
Manual, Executive acquiescence in the Court’s interpretation of a
provision
over an extended period of time is entitled to great weight in light of
the
relative ease with which the Manual can be amended).