United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372 (as a general matter, appellate courts have permitted greater latitude and flexibility when it comes to treatment and testimony of child witnesses).
United States v. Washington, 63 M.J. 418 (MRE 603 is designed to afford the flexibility required in dealing with children, and affirmation is simply a solemn undertaking to tell the truth; MRE 603 requires no special verbal formula, but instead requires that the oath be meaningful to the witness, including a child witness, and impress upon the witness the duty to tell the truth).
(the law is clear, both in the text of MRE 603 and its analysis, and in federal circuit case law, that a particular formula is not required in administering an oath or affirmation, although adherence to the benchbook formula will minimize dispute; this is particularly true in the case of children, where oaths and affirmations may be specially tailored to impress on the particular child the importance of telling the truth; this can be accomplished, as it has been accomplished for many years, without imparting to the child the perils of perjury).
(the failure to
oath before a child witness’s testimony was error, and the error was
the plain text of MRE 603 required the child witness, by oath or
to declare that she would testify truthfully before testifying; the
colloquy between the child witness and trial counsel fell short of this
however, appellant’s plain error claim fails because he cannot show he
materially prejudiced by the error where the trial counsel asked if the
witness knew the difference between the truth and a lie, and she
she understood, where at the end of her testimony, the child witness
that she had told the whole truth and nothing but the truth, where she
swore that everything she said had been the truth, and where after the
witness was recalled, she also stated that she had told the truth the
day; although the colloquy between the trial counsel and the child
not a formal oath or affirmation, the witness demonstrated that she
her duty to tell the truth; in short, consistent with the purpose of
but not its temporal requirement, the record of trial reveals that the
witness was alert to the necessity of telling the truth both at the
of her testimony and at the outset of the second day of her testimony).
United States v. Cano, 61 M.J. 74 (there is a good deal of scholarly debate in the area of child suggestibility and its effect on the reliability of the testimony of a child victim; however, scholars agree that the danger of false testimony from a child is greater when the child is subjected to highly suggestive interviewing techniques such as “closed” (yes/no) questions and “multiple interviews with multiple interviewers”).
United States v. McCollum, 58 MJ 323 (if the Government makes an adequate showing of necessity, the Government interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant; the showing of necessity must not be a generalized one; the trial judge must make a case-specific finding that testimony outside the presence of the accused is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child who seeks to testify; moreover, denial of face-to-face confrontation is only necessary to protect a child witness from trauma where it is the presence of the defendant that causes the trauma; finally, before a court denies an accused the right to confront a witness face-to-face, the trial court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify).
(M.R.E. 611(d)(3) authorizes remote live testimony where the military judge makes a finding on the record that a child is unable to testify in open court in the presence of the accused, for any of the following reasons: (A) The child is unable to testify because of fear; (B) There is substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that the child would suffer emotional trauma from testifying; (C) The child suffers from a mental or other infirmity; or (D) Conduct by an accused or defense counsel causes the child to be unable to continue testifying).
(M.R.E. 611(d)(3) authorizes the use of remote live testimony where the military judge makes a finding on the record that a child is unable to testify in open court in the presence of the accused; we interpret this language as limiting the use of remote live testimony to situations where the military judge makes a finding that the child witness would suffer more than de minimis emotional distress from testifying in the accused’s presence, whether brought on by fear or some form of trauma; in other words, under M.R.E. 611(d)(3), such distress must be sufficiently serious that it would prevent the child from reasonably testifying).
(while the finding of necessity under M.R.E. 611(d)(3) must be based on trauma resulting from the accused’s presence and not the overall court experience, that finding need not require that a child’s trauma derive solely from the presence of the accused; judges are simply prohibited from considering trauma resulting from sources other than the accused in making a finding of necessity; so long as the finding is based on the fear or trauma caused by the accused’s presence alone, it is irrelevant whether the child witness would also suffer some fear or trauma from testifying generally).
(M.R.E. 611(d) does not require a military judge to interview a child witness before ruling on a motion for remote live testimony; the language of M.R.E. 611(d) requires a "finding on the record," without any specific evidentiary prerequisites; while it may be appropriate, and even necessary, in some circumstances for a military judge to question or observe a child witness before ruling that he or she may testify outside of an accused’s presence, such action is not required per se; rather, a proper finding may be based on unrebutted expert testimony alone, if such testimony provides the military judge with sufficient information).
(M.R.E. 611(d)(3)(A) does not require a finding that a child fear imminent harm from the accused; nor does the rule require that the fear be reasonable; it provides that the fear of the accused be of such a nature that it prevents the child from being able to testify in the accused’s presence).
States v. Hughes,
52 MJ 278 (despite a finding by the military judge that
would not understand the significance of testifying truthfully in a
proceeding, the military judge’s ruling that the child’s pretrial
were admissible hearsay constituted implicit finding that child was
receiving just impressions of the facts and relating them truly).