2007
(in this case, the military
judge erred when he determined that a failure to remember facts
contained in a prior statement cannot be inconsistent with in-court
testimony that differs from those facts; an inconsistency for purposes
of MRE 613 may be found not only in diametrically opposed answers, but
also in inability to recall, or equivocation; a military judge has
considerable discretion to determine if the trial testimony is
inconsistent with a prior statement; but here the military judge
appears not to have understood that an inability to recall or a
non-responsive answer may present an inconsistency for purposes of MRE
613; consequently, his evidentiary ruling, based on an incorrect
understanding of the law, was an abuse of discretion).
(the military judge did not
abuse his discretion in rejecting a defense attempt, under the guise of
impeachment by inconsistent testimony, to bring in new evidence that
related to a point that the witness had not testified to at trial; the
witness was not asked about this point during his testimony, there was
no inconsistency, and the defense had not established a foundation for
later impeachment).
2005
United
States v. Meghdadi, 60 M.J. 438 (M.R.E. 608(c) [Evidence of bias]
permits
introduction of evidence, extrinsic or otherwise, tending to establish
bias,
prejudice, or motive to misrepresent on the part of a witness; M.R.E.
613(b)
[Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness] permits
the
extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements if the witness
denies
making them, or equivocates).
2001
United
States v. Palmer, 55 MJ 205 (although the usual
practice
is to confront the witness with an inconsistent statement during
cross-examination, it is permissible to delay any mention of the
inconsistent
statement until other witnesses are called).
(military judge did not abuse his discretion by sustaining objection
to
alleged inconsistent statement where defense counsel’s proffer was
vague,
misdirected under the rules of evidence, not linked to the credibility
of a
prior witness, and did not allude to the inconsistency between the
pretrial
statement and trial testimony as the basis for admission).
2000