United States v. Vasquez, 54 MJ 303 (Mil. R. Evid. 410 is generally taken from Fed. R. Evid 410, but is broader because it encompasses statements made in connection with a request for administrative disposition in lieu of court-martial).
(an excessively formalistic or technical approach to Mil. R. Evid. 410 may undermine the policy of the rule to encourage the flow of information during the plea-bargaining process).
(Mil. R. Evid. 410 does not require that protected plea bargaining statements be related to offenses pending before the court-martial at which they are offered).
(under Mil. R. Evid. 410, appellant’s admission of guilt in conjunction with a request for administrative separation in lieu of court martial was not admissible even though those statements related to an offense not pending before the court-martial; those statements related to an absence offense which was still pending in the sense that the government remained free to prosecute appellant until jurisdiction terminated by virtue of appellant’s discharge).
United States v. Anderson, 55 MJ 182 (the protections of Mil. R. Evid. 410 are not limited to plea-bargaining statements that relate only to the offenses pending before the court-martial at which they are offered).
(under Mil. R. Evid. 420, charges are pending until an appellant receives the quid pro quo for his admission of guilt made to obtain a discharge in lieu of trial: an executed discharge).
(Mil. R. Evid. 410 must be interpreted broadly in order to carry out the policy underlying the rule, which is to encourage the flow of information during the plea-bargaining process).
(even though it was a personnel record, a document purporting to approve an accused’s request for discharge in lieu of court-martial on other charges was inadmissible during sentencing under Mil. R. Evid. 410: (1) the document reflected that appellant had bargained for disposition of the earlier charges without trial; (2) the request for discharge was tantamount to a statement because an admission of guilt was an integral part of the discharge process; and (3) because the administrative discharge was not executed and appellant had not received the benefit of his bargain in the earlier case, those earlier charges were still pending).United States v. Grijalva, 55 MJ 223 (the protections of Mil. R. Evid. 410, which are not to be applied in an excessively formalistic or technical approach, apply by implication to a plea that is rejected by the military judge).