CORE CRIMINAL LAW SUBJECTS: Crimes: Art. 134 - Obstructing Justice

2005


United States v. Reeves, 61 M.J. 108 (the administration of justice is not criminally obstructed by a witness exercising that witness’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel).
 
(without more, a person’s advice to another to invoke certain rights, where the advice given is honest and uncorrupt, should not as a matter of law sustain a conviction to obstruction of justice; however, that does not mean, as a matter of law, that reference to advice as constitutional, precludes consideration as to whether that advice was indeed constitutional in nature, uncorrupt, and thus protected conduct for the purposes of obstruction under Article 134). 
 
(whether an accused’s conduct was wrongful and thus constituted obstruction of justice will turn on contextual factors presenting questions of fact for the members, including, among other things, the actor’s tone and manner of delivery; in those instances where the advice given is honest, uncorrupt, and disinterested, we agree that giving such advice is not wrongful; but one who advises, with a corrupt motive, that a witness exercise a constitutional right or privilege may obstruct the administration of justice; the lawful behavior of the person invoking the right cannot be used to protect the criminal behavior of the inducer; and this is the analytic approach taken by a majority of the federal circuits).
 
(as a matter of law, and under the circumstances of this case, an accused may be convicted of obstruction of justice by telling another not to speak to investigators and to seek counsel; the facts indicate that appellant was not a disinterested party; she was aware of the investigation into her conduct and that the person she advised to exercise her rights was a potential witness in that investigation; the nature and manner of her advice took her statements to the potential witness outside the zone of constitutional protection).
 
(a wrongful act is one done without legal justification or with some sinister purpose; advising a witness to exercise certain constitutional rights and privileges may be wrongful if accompanied by a corrupt motive to influence, impede, or otherwise obstruct the due administration of justice).      

(where the record indicates that shortly after being apprised she was under investigation for her conduct with another servicemember, appellant began frequently calling that servicemember at her workplace and home to advise her not to talk to a defense counsel or to law enforcement personnel, a rational trier of fact might have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant’s statements were wrongful and indicative of an intent to dissuade the servicemember from cooperating with the recently initiated investigation; even if one accepts for the sake of argument that telling a witness not to speak to investigators is tantamount to advising a witness of that witness’s right to silence, the tone, frequency, and background of appellant’s calls raised legitimate questions of fact for the members regarding the wrongfulness and intent of the calls).

 

2002


United States v. Barner, 56 MJ 131 (court finds evidence legally sufficient to support findings of guilty to every element of obstruction of justice where: (1) military court members could have concluded that an attempt on the part of a senior drill instructor to get trainees to change their story for reasons relating to race was not only wrongful, but in the context of a basic training environment, prejudicial to good order and discipline; (2) appellant’s statement that "I’ll do anything if you don’t tell" and its converse implication of more severe treatment if the trainee did not accede was not consistent with the duties of a senior drill sergeant; (3) appellant’s request that one trainee write a statement against a complaining trainee sufficiently qualified as wrongful; (4) appellant knew his offense against the trainee had been reported and that the trainee was pursuing the matter; and (5) court members could reasonable conclude that a senior drill instructor to whom the initial offense had been reported had a duty to pursue the complaint lodged by the trainees).


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