United
States v. Holbrook, 66 M.J. 31 (the fraudulent
enlistment statute, Article 83,
UCMJ, and the
(not
every fact regarding a qualification for
enlistment may be material; the President’s addition of the adjective
“material” to the second element of the fraudulent enlistment offense
in the
(no
authority supports the argument that to be
guilty of fraudulent enlistment, an accused must know that the facts he
misrepresented were material to his enlistment at the time he made
them,
because that makes criminal liability turn on whether the untruthful
applicant
to the armed forces knows that the truth might preclude his enlistment;
it
would be irrational to require that an applicant fully understand the
consequences of a truthful statement because it would mean prospective
enlistees would need to possess thorough knowledge of the service’s
enlistment
standards and policies prior to applying for and entering active duty).
(it
is undisputed that appellant’s providence
inquiry established that he was enlisted in the armed forces, received
pay and
allowances, knowingly misrepresented the extent of his preservice drug
use, and
that such prior drug use was relevant to qualification for enlistment
in the
Coast Guard -- i.e., material; appellant’s providence inquiry
established both
every element of an Article 83, UCMJ, offense and the facts alleged in
the
specification; any prevarication during the providence inquiry
regarding the
timing of Appellant’s knowledge of the materiality of his
misrepresentations
did not raise a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning his
guilty
plea to a violation of Article 83, UCMJ).
(appellant’s guilty plea to
fraudulent enlistment was provident even
though the military judge failed to establish appellant’s knowledge
that the
facts he misrepresented were material to his enlistment at the time he
made
them; that knowledge was not necessary for his guilty plea to
fraudulent
enlistment to be provident).