2008 (Transition)
United
States v. Day, 66 M.J. 172 (the meaning of
“official” in Article 107 has
been analogized with the language of its federal analogue, 18 U.S.C. §
1001,
prohibiting any false statement made concerning “any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States,” as
interpreted
liberally by the federal courts; at the same time, Article 107 and 18
U.S.C. §
1001 are not perfectly congruent; the scope of Article 107 is more
expansive
than its civilian counterpart, because the primary purpose of military
criminal
law - to maintain morale, good order, and discipline - has no parallel
in
civilian criminal law).
(the fact that allegedly false
official
statements were made to a civilian or a military member is not
dispositive of
their official nature; rather, the critical distinction is not whether
the
recipient of a statement is civilian or military, but whether the
statements
relate to the official duties of either the speaker or the hearer, and
whether
those official duties fall within the scope of the UCMJ’s reach).
(false official statements are
not limited to
line of duty statements).
(false statements made by
appellant to
civilian personnel who were members of the base fire department charged
with
performing an on-base military function were “official” under Article
107,
UCMJ, where these personnel were providing on-base emergency services
pursuant
to the commander’s interest in and responsibility for the health and
welfare of
dependents residing in base housing over which he exercised command
responsibility).
(in theory, statements made to
an off-base 911
operator might implicate Article 107, UCMJ, in situations where, among
other
things, there is a predictable and necessary nexus to on-base persons
performing official military functions on behalf of the command;
however, in
this case, the evidence was not sufficient to conclude that the
allegedly false
official statements made to an off-base civilian 911 operator were
official).
2007
United
States v. Wright,
65 M.J. 373 (one element of the offense of making a false official
statement
requires that the statement be false in certain particulars as opposed
to
totally false).
United
States v. Teffeau, 58 MJ 62 (Article 107, UCMJ,
punishes
any person subject to the UCMJ, who, with intent to deceive, makes a
false
official statement knowing it to be false; a statement is "official"
if that statement is "made in the line of duty;" the definition of
"official" does not mean that the President intended to limit
"line of duty" in this context to the meaning those words may have in
other, non-criminal contexts; in fact, the Court has recognized that
the scope
of Article 107, UCMJ, is more expansive than its civilian counterpart,
18
U.S.C. § 1001, because the primary purpose of military criminal law –
to
maintain morale, good order, and discipline – has no parallel in
civilian
criminal law).
(statements made by appellant to civilian police officers were
official
where they concerned an incident and investigation that bore a direct
relationship to his military duties and status).
(any absolute rule that statements to civilian law enforcement
officials can
never be official within the meaning of Article 107, UCMJ, is rejected;
any
such construction of Article 107, UCMJ, is unreasonably restrictive in
light of
the unique purposes of Article 107, UCMJ, and military criminal law).
2002
(paragraph 31c(6)(a) expressly provides that a statement is "not an
official statement within the meaning of the article" in the absence of
an
independent duty or obligation to speak, which suggests that it may
serve
simply as a reflection of case law under Article 107 rather than as a
rule of
limitation; neither the drafting history, nor any other source,
demonstrates
that the pertinent language in paragraph 31c(6)(a) was included in the
Manual
for any purpose other than as an attempt to reflect an interpretation
of
Article 107 under then-existing case law -- an interpretation that is
no longer
valid).
United
States v. Czeschin, 56 MJ 346 (paragraph 31c(6)(a)
does
not establish a right that may be asserted by an accused who is charged
with
violating Article 107).
2000
United
States v. Nelson, 53 MJ 319, (statements
to criminal investigators can be
prosecuted under Article 107; the court has rejected application of the
“exculpatory no” doctrine to Article 107).
(where appellant did not assert at trial that her statement to
criminal
investigators was not an official statement because she did not have an
independent duty or obligation to speak (paragraph 31c(6)(a), MCM),
appellant
failed to preserve that issue for appellate review).