United
States v. Springer, 58 MJ 164 (Cruelty,
oppression, or
maltreatment, although not necessarily physical, must be measured by an
objective standard; the imposition of necessary or proper duties and
the
exaction of their performance does not constitute this offense even
though the
duties are arduous or hazardous or both; there is no need to show
actual harm,
rather it is only necessary to show, as measured from an objective
viewpoint in
light of the totality of the circumstances, that the accused’s actions
reasonably could have caused physical or mental harm or suffering).
2002
United
States v. Carson, 57 MJ 410 (although the words
used by
Congress to describe the proscribed conduct -- "cruelty,"
"oppression," and "maltreatment" -- depict situations that
frequently involve physical or mental suffering on the part of the
victim, the
legislative history to Article 93, UCMJ, does not indicate that
Congress sought
to exclude cases meeting an objective standard).
(Article 93, UCMJ, does not preclude a conviction when, as an
objective
matter, the accused has engaged in behavior that amounts to cruelty,
oppression, or maltreatment, even though the proof of harm or injury to
the
victim might fall short of demonstrating actual physical and mental
pain or
suffering; the essence of the offense is abuse of authority; whether
conduct
constitutes "maltreatment" within the meaning of Article 93, UCMJ, in
a particular case requires an objective evaluation of the specific
facts and
circumstances of that case).
(in a prosecution for maltreatment under Article 93, UCMJ, it is not
necessary to prove physical or mental harm or suffering on the part of
the
victim, although proof of such harm or suffering may be an important
aspect of
proving that the conduct meets the objective standard; it is only
necessary to
show, as measured from an objective viewpoint in light of the totality
of the
circumstances, that the accused's actions reasonably could have caused
physical
or mental harm or suffering).
2001
United
States v. Brown, 55 MJ 375 (conduct amounting to
sexual
harassment can be punished as a military offense if it constitutes
maltreatment
of a subordinate under Article 93, UCMJ).
2000
United
States v. Fuller, 54 MJ 107 (evidence of
maltreatment was
found legally insufficient where the conviction was based primarily on
evidence
of consensual sexual relations between appellant and a PFC who was a
female
soldier in appellant’s unit; Article 93, UCMJ, is not a strict
liability
offense punishing all improper relationships between superior and
subordinates)
(appellant was a superior noncommissioned officer and PFC’s platoon
sergeant, a relationship which could create a unique situation of
dominance and
control; however, where PFC was apparently not intoxicated and was a
willing
participant throughout an entire evening, the record in this case
provided no
indication that PFC felt unable to resist appellant’s actions)
(considered in light of the facts and
circumstances of the case, a comment by appellant to another
noncommissioned
officer, to the effect of "you’ve gotta get some of this", was
legally insufficient standing alone to constitute the offense of
maltreatment
by sexual harassment; although the comment may have been embarrassing
to a
female PFC, but the comment does not support a finding of maltreatment
by
sexual harassment).
(under the circumstances of this
case, appellant’s conduct did not constitute maltreatment; however,
that
conduct, including sexual relations with a PFC and encouraging another
noncommissioned officer to have sexual intercourse with her, was
prejudicial to
good order and discipline or service discrediting and constituted the
lesser-included offense of a simple disorder under Article 134, UCMJ).
1999
United
States v. Knight, 52 MJ 47 (it was not necessary to
determine
whether Article 93, UCMJ, has an “officiality” requirement where
appellant
pleaded guilty and admitted that his conduct violated the maltreatment
prohibition, admitted that he used a phony credit card known to be
derived from
confidential information in appellant’s official control as a result of
military duties, and knew that his conduct would cause the victim
command
embarrassment).
(appellant’s construction of Article 93, UCMJ, as requiring the
prosecution
to show that appellant was acting in a supervisory role when he
maltreated the
victim is not supported by the plain language of the statute, but under
the
circumstances of appellant’s guilty plea the CAAF did not decide that
legal
question).