MILITARY JUSTICE PERSONNEL: Military Judge: Generally


2008 (Transition)

 

United States v. Mackie, 66 M.J. 198 (a military judge abuses his discretion when the findings of fact upon which he predicates his ruling are not supported by the evidence of record, if incorrect legal principles were used, or if his application of the correct legal principles to the facts is clearly unreasonable). 

 

(the military judge abused his discretion in this case by denying the defense request for a sanity board, where the trial defense counsel detailed concerns that because of the accused’s memory loss, he might not be able to assist in his own defense, might not be fit to stand trial, and that similar memory loss may have occurred during the alleged misconduct, where the accused submitted an affidavit detailing specific instances of blackouts and memory loss over a six-month period, and where the opinions of the accused’s treating clinical psychologist in the form of a stipulation of expected testimony were not an adequate substitute for a sanity board; this psychologist had seen the accused twice by appointment and once for a brief walk-in conversation, never conducted a forensic examination or participated in a sanity board, and was unaware of the accused’s claimed memory losses and blackouts). 


(where the issues of mental responsibility and competency were raised by the accused’s motion for a sanity board and with no indication that the motion was made in bad faith or was frivolous, the military judge should have granted the motion; even assuming a medical examination by a qualified physician could take the place of a sanity board, the stipulation in this case, which failed to provide the specific substantive information required under RCM 706(c), was a legally erroneous basis upon which to deny the motion). 

 

2007


United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221 (military judges are presumed to know the law and to follow it absent clear evidence to the contrary; as part of this presumption, military judges are presumed to be able to distinguish between proper and improper sentencing arguments). 

 

United States v. Moran, 65 M.J. 178 (military judges, unlike lay members, are presumed capable of filtering out inadmissible evidence).


2006

 

United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405 (a military judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and fairly). 

 

(both the accused and the government are permitted to question the military judge and to present evidence regarding a possible ground for disqualification; should grounds arise, the military judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which that military judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned).

 

United States v. Hill, 62 M.J. 271 (MRE 606(b) does not apply to military judges; an extra-judicial statement by a military judge may be given appropriate consideration on appeal, subject to certain qualifications).


(as a general matter, military judges are presumed to know the rules of evidence and to consider testimony only for permissible purposes; that presumption is strengthened by the prompt action of a trial judge, which expressly cuts off and rejects questionable testimony; just as it is presumed that the members follow the instructions of the military judge, it is also presumed that a military judge adheres to his own evidentiary rulings). 

 

2000

United States v. Robbins, 52 MJ 455 (a military judge is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, is presumed capable of filtering out inadmissible evidence, and is presumed not to have relied on such evidence on the question of guilt or innocence).

United States v. Norfleet, 53 MJ 262 (military judges are expected to render decisions that may adversely impact on their superior officers; such decisions by the military judiciary are essential to the maintenance of a military justice system that not only is fair, but that also is perceived to be fair by members of the armed forces and the public).

1999

United States v. Williams, 50 MJ 397 (the military judge may be presumed to know about law and precedent, and be presumed to have afforded an accused his rights under them).

United States v. Cooper, 51 MJ 247 (due process of law requires that an accused be tried by a judge who has no direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary or other disqualifying interest in the accused’s conviction).


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