2007
United
States v. McAllister, 64 M.J. 248 (just as an
accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his
own witnesses to establish a defense; this right is a fundamental
element of due process of law).
(in light of the evidence derived from DNA re-testing and
revealed at the DuBay factfinding hearing on remand, the
military judge’s error in denying the accused’s request for expert DNA
assistance and refusing to permit a re-test of certain evidence for the
presence of DNA deprived the accused of his due process right to
present evidence establishing a defense based on the discovery of DNA
from three unidentified individuals on the victim’s fingernails).
2005
United
States v. Kreutzer,
61 M.J. 293 (compulsory process, equal access to evidence and
witnesses, and
the right to necessary expert assistance in presenting a defense are
guaranteed
to military accuseds through the Sixth Amendment, Article 46, UCMJ, 10
USC §
846, and RCM 703(d)).
(where a request for the
expert
assistance of a mitigation specialist is erroneously denied, that
ruling
implicates the right to present a defense, compulsory process, and due
process
conferred by the Constitution, the right to obtain witnesses and
evidence conferred
by Article 46, UCMJ, and the right to the assistance of necessary
experts
conferred by RCM 703(d)).
2003
United
States v. Teffeau, 58 MJ 62 (fundamental due
process
demands that an accused be afforded the opportunity to defend against a
charge
before a conviction on the basis of that charge can be sustained; few
constitutional principles are more firmly established than a
defendant’s right
to be heard on the specific charges of which he is accused).
2002
United
States v. Jeffers, 57 MJ 13 (order to
have no
social contact with a named person did not inhibit appellant’s ability
to
prepare his defense; nothing in the order could have been interpreted
as
restricting appellant’s access to that person, a potential witness
against him,
so long as the meeting with that individual was official business, and
there
were no facts developed at trial, either through motions, objections or
testimony, that showed the order interfered with an attorney-client
relationship, or impaired defense counsel’s trial preparation).
2001
United
States v. Dimberio, 56 MJ 224 (a defendant has a
constitutional right to present a defense, including compulsory due
process to
compel the attendance of defense witnesses and the right to introduce
their
testimony into evidence).
(the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, and the Manual for
Courts-Martial each provide that the servicemember- accused is entitled
to
expert assistance when necessary for an adequate defense).
(the Constitution does not confer upon an accused the right to
present any
and all types of evidence at trial, but only that evidence which is
legally and
logically relevant).
(although expert opinion evidence of a psychiatric diagnosis or
personality
disorder does not fit within the exceptions noted in Mil.R.Evid.
404(a), the
accused nonetheless has a constitutional right to introduce the
evidence if it
is otherwise legally and logically relevant under Mil.R.Evid. 401-403).
(rules such as Mil.R.Evid. 403 and 404(a) that exclude evidence from
criminal trials do not abridge an accused’s constitutional right to
present a
defense so long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes
they are designed to serve and do not infringe upon a weighty
constitutional
interest of the accused).
2000
United
States v. Browning, 54 MJ 1 (the constitutional
right to
present evidence to defend against charges is not absolute).
1999
United
States v. Lewis, 51 MJ 376 (appellant was prejudicially
chilled
in the presentation of his defense case where military judge
erroneously held
view that RCM 701(b)(2) required presentation of corroborating
witnesses in
order to establish innocent ingestion defense and thereby: (1)
prevented
appellant from introducing evidence which could have rebutted the
government’s
circumstantial case on the issue of knowledge; (2) would not permit
defense
counsel to introduce any evidence that some person may have had a
motive to
contaminate appellant’s drink on certain nights; (3) prevented
persuasive
argument on this specific defense theory; and (4) failed to instruct
the
members that the government had the burden with respect to the
circumstantial
defense evidence of innocent ingestion actually admitted, as well that
which
was erroneously excluded).